Our response to the Panel’s four non-exclusive options

Training Afghan security forces: When it comes to providing security to Kandahar Province on the longer term, it is essential to train, support and develop the Afghan security forces. This should be a core task for the Canadian military. Moreover, the Afghan military currently has a structural shortage of uniforms, ammunition and other essential equipment. They also do not receive their salaries on time, obviously a critical issue in effective military development. As they do for the Police in Kandahar, Canadian military mentors should distribute Afghan troops’ salaries.



Phased withdrawal: It is very doubtful the phased withdrawal of Canadian troops can start as early as February 2009 without this being tantamount to an abandonment of the Karzai Government and the people of Kandahar Province. Given that currently the security situation is worsening and that development efforts are at a standstill, a longer commitment of Canadian forces is critical, with sufficient troop numbers that allow both targeted counter-insurgency operations and a military role in humanitarian and development aid.




No other (inter)national troops available: Despite the fact that more international and Afghan troops are needed in Kandahar Province, these are currently not available. In neighbouring Uruzgan Province the Netherlands have just been asked to extend their mission as other countries are not available to replace the Dutch troops after the initial mission end date of August 2008. The situation in Kandahar will not be much different as many NATO and non-NATO countries are showing very little political will to assist ISAF in the troublesome southern parts of the country. That means that Canada cannot focus on a purely non-military role in Kandahar in the coming years. However, Canada should further shift its military policy towards aid and short-term development efforts focusing more on “Quick Impact Projects”: targeting basic needs and involving the local community in project design and implementation.



The military should deliver aid: Current available food supplies are not getting through to the people in need. Aside from the deteriorating security situation, there are simply not enough local and international aid organisations in Kandahar to implement Canadian development programmes. This means that in Kandahar the military is the only actor with the capacity to secure the coordination and delivery of food aid and other forms of humanitarian assistance. In general, the Canadian Government should make sure there is a dramatic increase in funding for humanitarian aid and development projects.




Re-focusing the Canadian mission in Afghanistan towards a different region of the country would further weaken NATO-ISAF’s stabilisation mission. ISAF is already suffering from national caveats of many troop contributing countries, which prevents proper allocation and geographical distribution of ISAF-troops towards the most problematic areas. As the birthplace of the Taliban, Kandahar is a crucial province when it comes to stability and security. If Kandahar City falls to the Taliban, the insurgency will again have secured a stable and totemic base from which to threaten Kabul and the rest of the country.




Since 2001, Canada has committed itself to Afghanistan. It has promised the Afghan Government support in defeating the Taliban insurgency and creating better living conditions for the people. That commitment is far from being fulfilled as the Afghan Government and the people currently need more help now than ever. The Afghan road to peace and prosperity is rockier than ever before. In addition, Canada’s presence in Afghanistan is necessary to ensure that Al Qaeda and related extremist elements do not again have a geo-political base for their global terrorist actions. Consequently, the withdrawal of Canadian troops should be linked to specific measures of success and not to an arbitrary calendar date determined by a domestic political agenda. So far, Canada and its international partners already have difficulties convincing the Afghans that they are in Afghanistan to see their task through to the end.

Building on elements of these four options, The Senlis Council recommends the Panel to consider an alternative option:



As soon as possible, Canada sets clear objectives and measures of success for its security, development and reconstruction tasks in Kandahar. The focus within development efforts will further shift to immediate impact humanitarian aid with the military being the key delivery actor until enough international and Afghan aid organisations are on the ground and able to take over these tasks. Humanitarian aid delivery should also be made subject to clear measures of success. Additional funding should be made available for reconstruction and development efforts. Canada should commit to remaining in Kandahar after 2009 and make its future withdrawal from Kandahar subject to a thorough assessment of progress made based on the established measures of success.