2.1 Recent Developments
Appointment of new Prime Minister and Cabinet
2007 marked political crises that led to the resignation of the former Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, and the appointment of a new cabinet. Under a clan power-sharing deal announced in November 2007, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, from the Darood clan, appointed respected Hawiye clan figure Nur Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister. The TFG is currently dominated by the Darood/Majerteen, Hawiye/Abgal and Rahanwhein clans and sub-clans. The Hawiye clan holds the greatest influence in the capital Mogadishu. After the Majerteen, the Rahanwein reportedly comprise the second largest clan grouping in the TFG army.
“The government must be a government for everyone, not just those that support the government.”
Government Representative
Mogadishu, March 2008
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In response to public criticisms regarding the formation and quality of the cabinet, and considering the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Congress, the newly appointed Prime Minister appointed a new cabinet with members chosen from both within and outside parliament. Prime Minister Hussein’s efforts to establish a government of national unity, to reach out to rival groups and engage with all Somalis were regarded as a renewed opportunity for a peaceful transition to a democratic regime. Nonetheless, internal divisions, a lack of transparency and power rivalry have hindered these efforts and continue to thwart the authority and legitimacy of the TFG.
As the TFG’s five-year mandate draws to a close in 2009, the chances of the TFG holding national elections to establish a functioning Somali state and a permanent government look increasingly bleak. Public disillusionment over the lack of national unity and the TFG’s broken promises is growing; the TFG’s inaction over insecurity is pushing people toward more radical positions as a matter of survival.
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Failed attempts at national reconciliation
Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, at least 15 national reconciliation conferences have been convened, each seeking to resolve the internal political differences and establish a credible and effective central government.
The most recent National Reconciliation Conference was held in July-August 2007. The international community expressed its broad support for this attempt, providing USD 8 million through United Nations Development Program to strengthen the capacity of its independent oversight body, the National Governance and Reconciliation Committee.
While the conference resulted in key resolutions aimed at resolving the conflict, efforts proved to be restricted by the lack of participation of several important opposition parties. Accordingly, the groups not involved in the discussions denounced the resolutions.
Prime Minister urging dialogue with all parties
The inability to secure the involvement, purposefully or not, of all parties in the reconciliation process was depicted as the key impediment to Somalia’s stability by the new Prime Minister Hussein. His efforts for political reconciliation focused on addressing the failure to engage all opposition groups, promising to talk to all Somali groups without precondition and releasing political prisoners. The Prime Minister’s declaration of an unconditional offer to engage in dialogue with opposition forces has triggered increased consultation with these groups, raising hopes for a political resolution. The Somali public welcomed these confidence-building steps and urged the Prime Minister to build on this positive momentum.
However, the Prime Minister’s attempts were faced strong resistance from within the TFG and from its international partners, primarily the US. President Abdullahi Yusuf has often undercut the Prime Minister and sought to obstruct talks with those he labels radical Islamists. The internal backlash was illustrated in February 2008, when TFG security forces launched an attack in Bakara market, where the armed opposition had dominated. It is believed that the incident aimed to block the emerging alliance between moderate opposition forces and the Prime Minister.
“The Prime Minister’s efforts should be supported. Everyone supports him no matter what clan or political interest. The only people who don’t actually support him is the President himself, and the Ethiopians. He is just one man, and deserves the support of everyone who wants peace.”
Elder
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Transitional Federal Government lacks credibility and legitimacy
It has become increasingly apparent that the TFG is little more than a loose assembly of frequently competing individuals, lacking transparency and credibility. Efforts to establish a government of national unity have been faced with strong resistance by those TFG members who believe that a genuine reconciliation process is not in their interest. Prime Minister Hussein has promised to talk to the opposition without precondition and has actively supported the engagement of all Somalis regardless of their political affiliation. His decision to release some of Mogadishu’s elders and journalist detainees in January 2008 and to promote an inclusive political process was welcomed by the UN and the majority of Somalis.
In contrast, President Abdullahi Yusuf’s tone is less conciliatory and more militaristic, allowing personal agendas within the TFG to derail political resolution. Reports of TFG soldiers engaging in widespread looting combined with poor governance and increased insecurity have further compromised the President’s authority.
“The government forces are hyenas wearing shoes.”
“The government forces are basically out of control bandits.”
Identities withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Although Prime Minister Hussein appears vulnerable with no control over the TFG’s finances and security forces, the Somali public respects and endorses his efforts. Within a government that lacks cohesion and is regarded by its people as increasingly illegitimate, only the prime minister’s credibility and popularity continues to rise.
Opposition remains fragmented
Similar to the TFG’s lack of cohesion, opposition based inside and outside Somalia is not homogenous. Some opposition groups appear more moderate and have responded to the calls for political dialogue and reconciliation.
In contrast, others have espoused a belligerent approach toward the transitional government. The Eritrea-based umbrella organisation Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) headed by the ICU leader Sheikh Ahmed and former parliamentary speaker Sharif Hassan, who chairs the ARS Central Committee. The ARS represents the most powerful opposition group comprised of ousted Islamists and fairly moderate ICU members, former parliamentarians, civil society including business people, and the diaspora. The Alliance was officially formed during an opposition conference attended by 200 delegates, which was held in Asmara, Eritrea in September 2007. The balance between the ICU and parliamentary groups is central to the political identity and character of the ARS. Radical ICU leader Aweys also attended the conference but rejected claims he holds a formal position in the Alliance. Notably, the Alliance has influence primarily within the Hawiye community though, even within this group, there are divisions.
Some elements of the ARS have exploited the recent US designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist group to further distance themselves from Al-Shabab, and portray themselves as a legitimate opposition to the TFG.
Insurgency rife
In addition to the various stakeholders, including former members of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament, members of the Somali diaspora and clan elders, there are also a number of armed insurgent groups. The armed opposition is being waged primarily by four groups: ICU forces loyal to the ARS; ICU forces acting independently of the ARS; clan militias (including some secular nationalists); and the more radical Al-Shabab which aims to establish a regional caliphate. In contrast, ICU remnants aim to regain control in Somalia and call for jihad to expel Ethiopian troops from Somalia.
Public support for these groups is not directly related to the groups’ ideology but instead to what is perceived to be their contribution to Somalia’s liberation efforts. In particular, hard-line ICU elements enjoy growing popular support and reportedly receive funding from local businessmen, especially following the Bakara market attacks. Although many businesses seek the restoration of peace and security, Hawiye businessmen in particular perceive (with considerable justification) the TFG to be hostile to their interests. As such, businessmen are becoming important security actors: their private security forces represent some of the largest armed militias, particularly in Mogadishu. The Bakara militia has reportedly been functioning well and has brought a degree of security to one of Mogadishu’s most violent areas. There has been some degree of communication between the different insurgent groups; however, tensions and power struggles remain dominant.
“The designation of Al-Shabab as terrorists is outrageous. They are resistance fighters!”
Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
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Mogadishu, March 2008
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Incoherent international stance on Somalia
Neighbouring countries, foreign powers and international organisations have sought to promote a particular course of action in Somalia. Whilst the UN Secretary-General through its Special Representative in Somalia has striven to support Prime Minister Hussein’s efforts at promoting genuine reconciliation in the country, other international partners have sought to obstruct this process and, instead, favour opposing stakeholders in the conflict. This lack of a unified international stance (and in fact an often conflicting international stance) on Somalia has exacerbated internal divisions and friction.
Neighbouring states and long-term adversaries Ethiopia and Eritrea have their own strategic agendas and are essentially conducting a proxy war in Somalia. Since its invasion in Somalia in December 2006 to back TFG forces against the then dominant ICU, Ethiopia has been supporting President Abdullahi Yusuf and maintains a substantial number of troops on Somali ground.
Eritrea has supported Somali opposition groups; the powerful Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia is based in the country and the Eritrean government has been accused of arming and financing the insurgency in Somalia. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea has contributed to undermining peacemaking efforts and further destabilising and weakening Somalia.
The US intervention in Somalia as part of its global War on Terror is also distinct from international and Prime Minister Hussein’s conciliatory efforts. The US is not only directly funding selective branches of the TFG but has recently also exerted pressure on Prime Minister Hussein to restrict the number of those with whom he was prepared to engage in dialogue, in an attempt to exclude individuals on the US list of designated terror suspects such as principal ICU figures Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys .
In another measure that undercut the Prime Minister and disrupted the reconciliation process with all opposition parties including radical Islamists, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al-Shabab a foreign terrorist organisation.
An issue of grave public concern pertinent to the TFG’s legitimacy is foreign intervention in the country and, particularly, the continuing presence of Ethiopian troops. The persistence of President Abdullahi Yusuf on this issue has not only hindered national unity, with the Somali public now increasingly viewing the TFG as a puppet regime guided by the interests of neighbouring countries and foreign powers, but has also led to frequent and large-scale conflict between anti-government forces and government troops. ICU remnants and clan militias resisting foreign intervention in Somalia are gaining increasing popular support and continually challenge the authority and legitimacy of the TFG. The TFG’s perceived dependence on neighbouring Ethiopia, the strong US influence and the president’s complicity in the foreign intervention have weakened severely the TFG’s credibility as a national entity.
“We are extremely disappointed by the role of the international community. There is lots of money for the war and none for the ordinary people.”
Identity withheld
Mogadishu, March 2008
“We are tired of incompetent Americans. Either both President Bush and his staff are really incompetent, or they intended to act in ways that spreads extremism in Somalia.”
Businessman
Mogadishu, March 2008
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