By comparing the conflict dynamic in two different theatres central to the United States’ self-proclaimed War on Terror, a number of chronic failings in the US’ approach have become evident. Foreign policy projection under President Bush has been both insular and divisive, with the overly simple ‘with us or against us’ axiom being a blanket formula applied to all parts of the globe with results that can best be described as unequal.
Reliance upon such a blunt measure has contributed in no small measure to much of the increased instability present around the globe. Immediate term, traditional military ‘victories’ against the armed forces of states accused of harbouring terrorist movements make for spectacular 24/7 viewing in Anytown, USA. As the US military unleashes the latest cutting edge technology upon the most primitive of landscapes, commentators chatter excitedly about ‘surgical strikes’ and ‘laser-guided precision munitions’.
But after the fireworks display, comes the problematic ‘what next?’ phase of post-conflict reconstruction. Following expulsion of the bad guys (for now, at least), populations traumatised by decades of conflict and/or internal repression naturally expect their lives to improve in the aftermath of such overpowering external intervention.
It is precisely at this point that the War on Terror starts to struggle. As previously controlled political spaces suddenly have their shackles removed, repressed movements of every political and tribal hue burst into life, keen to reassert their presence. The experiences of Afghanistan and, most notably, Iraq, demonstrate that such unregulated space will eventually be filled by sub-state armed groups backed by armed militias, which flourish at a greater speed than emergent civil society and state institutions. Such security vacuums are also a ripe ground for Islamic extremism.
Afghanistan’s resurgent Taliban provide a bleak example of how failing US-led War on Terror policies have promoted extremists to a level of political legitimacy they would never ordinarily achieve. The Taliban and Al-Shabab are successfully exploiting policy mistakes such as aerial bombings, ongoing poverty, and aggressive foreign military presence to the extent that they are increasingly viewed by local populations as representatives of their legitimate political grievances.
The War on Terror: a chronically dysfunctional policy
The stark realities of the WOT dominates more subtle foreign policy discourse by the international community, and has resulted in a number of chronic problems that have led to both policy paralysis and increasing instability in WOT conflicts such as Afghanistan and Somalia:
- An absence of quantifiable metrics by which to measure success and failure, and lack of limitations upon the scope of military action, has allowed the US to act with relative impunity and without necessary levels of emotional intelligence or diplomatic sensitivity. Short-term approaches to highly complex problems have simply deepened existing fissures in WOT ‘target states’, and created a panoply of new ones;
- An over-militarised solution has resulted in a mounting number of civilian casualties, and made it impossible for the international community to deliver critical aid to those in most need (i.e. southern Afghanistan; Mogadishu) – a triple failure in humanitarian, effective COIN, and ‘smart power’ policies. Immediate term humanitarian needs in WOT theatres are not at the top of international priority lists, and it is a primary duty of care to resolve this situation;
- The international community is failing to condemn actors that are not making a positive contribution towards reconciliation (for instance, US aerial strikes in Somalia and Afghanistan);
- The international community is exceeding its competency level in trying to manage multiple conflicts simultaneously, resulting in military overstretch and donor fatigue. There is an inverse correlation between the complexity of states within which WOT operations are being waged, and the effectiveness of those operations;
- US must coordinate its WOT policies with other regional and international actors; unilateral action simply serves to isolate the country on the global stage.
The War on Terror: a Fast Track for action needed
There are gradual signs that the Bush Administration is toning down its WOT rhetoric, particularly in relation to Iraq and Pakistan, but change is come far too slowly and conflicts are spreading and intensifying at a far greater rate than US can change its approach to suit each theatre.
Although too late to right the multiple wrongs that have been committed in several of the War on Terror’s ‘battlegrounds’, a modified approach is already under serious discussion in Washington, and should be embraced by President Bush in the last months of his presidency.
A doctrine of ‘Smart Power’, as formulated by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, is gaining ground in the US military and policy communities, and its basic premise was encapsulated by General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.) and Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., USN (Ret.) at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (5 March 2008):
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“It is time, past time, for a new strategic triad – diplomacy and development, as well as defense – to prepare us for the challenges ahead.”
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Over-reliance upon conventional ‘hard power’ as a blunt instrument to eradicate terrorism has failed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is also failing in Somalia. Recent aerial strikes upon ‘High Value [terrorist] Targets’ in southern Somalia indicate that the US still has a long way to go before the promising allure of kinetic operations disappears.
Somalia
Somalia is a state in name only. Aside from the briefest of intervals, the last 17 years has been characterised by varying degrees of chaos as a wide array of actors seek to impose their own imprint upon the country, invariably at the cost of other interested parties. An abject lack of governance has created a huge political and security space for non-state actors to fill and exploit for their own purposes, while the areas of Puntland and Somaliland exist well outside the orbit of the central ‘government’.
Efforts to introduce stability have been frequent in both number and outcome. The international community’s insistence upon viewing this most complicated of conflicts through a standard prism of war/peace (and, even less effectively under President Bush, good/bad) has met with predictable levels of success.
The approach currently being adopted by the international community is underpinned by the following logic: Somalia is a failed state, ergo it poses a significant threat to international security as it provides shelter for militant Islamists. This situation can only be addressed by a functioning central government backed by reformed security services, and the first stage towards achieving that aim is staging a ‘peace conference’.
Unfortunately such gatherings are invariably hamstrung by numerous domestic and regional actors who seek to control the restoration of a functioning state. Even if a political resolution was reached, the vast levels of capital inflow required to establish functioning security forces have never been evident.
“The longer law and order is absent from Somalia, the greater the chance that international terrorists will use its territory as a safe haven, creating significant regional and international threats to peace and security.”
United Nations Security Council
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia
14 March 2008, p.4
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Somalia’s Chronic Problems
Somalia is blighted by a number of chronic problems that require addressing if it is to pull itself out of the quagmire. While all specific to the country itself, some are indicative of the underlying inability of the international community to act collectively and intelligently in conflict zones and failing states. For instance, measures are frequently designed to achieve short term tactical successes, with long term benchmarks apparently not featuring in strategic planning.
Credible reconciliation plan
Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, at least 15 national reconciliation conferences have been convened, each seeking – and failing – to resolve internal political differences and establish a credible and effective central government.
An inability to secure the involvement, purposefully or not, of all parties in the reconciliation process was depicted as the key impediment to Somalia’s stability.
Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein’s efforts for political reconciliation focus on addressing the failure to engage all opposition groups, promising to talk to all Somali groups without precondition and releasing political prisoners. This unconditional offer to engage in dialogue with opposition forces has triggered increased consultation with these groups, raising hopes for a political resolution. Support for these measures by the UN’s Special Representative provides another scrap of positive news in a bleak landscape.
Dire humanitarian situation
The current humanitarian situation in Somalia is at a level not seen since 1991, and the international community’s response is woefully inadequate. An unprecedented food emergency and constant fighting between myriad warring factions have elevated the humanitarian crisis to record levels. Unlike Darfur, where billions of dollars of aid are being invested and thousands of aid workers operate, Somalia remains a place to avoid. The United Nations estimates that the country received less than USD 200 million in 2007, and the number of aid workers in the country continues to decrease in direct proportion to the violence that affects Somalia.
External militaries and non state armed groups
While a military presence is required to bring stabilisation to Somalia, the current mix of forces in theatre is poorly-conceived and inflammatory. Ethiopian forces backed by US ‘surgical strikes’ and an ineffective African Union force have worsened the country’s security landscape. Clan militias, militant Islamists and the TFG’s own armed forces are also engaged in multi-layered violence, and unravelling this intra- and inter-state conflict lies at the core of the international community’s challenge.
A record of failure
Every actor involved in Somalia has contributed to the anarchic state that exists today:
a. United States
Although the State Department claims that fighting terrorism is part of a ‘comprehensive strategy,’ one element clearly dominates their approach. In applying the binary logic of the uncoordinated “War on Terror” to the complex political situation in Somalia, the Bush Administration has undermined the worthy reconciliation efforts of new Somali prime minister Nur Hassan Hussein and UN Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to achieve a political breakthrough through ‘open door’ mediation in the following ways:
- An ill-timed designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist organisation has enhanced their domestic status;
- Launching ‘targeted aerial strikes’ upon suspected militant strongholds has inflamed local sentiment against the US and the TFG;
- These bombings and sponsorship of a proxy Christian army – Ethiopia – to fight in Mogadishu have provided militant Islamists with abundant propaganda material.
b. Transitional Federal Government
The Somali TFG generally and the President in particular have acted as a spoiler in recent years. Whilst the new Prime Minister is acting as a positive agent for change, his ability to prosecute a progressive policy agenda is severely undermined for the following reasons:
- The TFG is an incoherent body characterised by a ‘zero sum game’ mentality. It is a loose collection of frequently opposed clan-based groups that seek to maximise their position at the expense of their rivals;
- It is failing to deliver any government services, security or aid, prompting the worst humanitarian crisis since early 1990s;
- It is unable, or unwilling, to provide a basic level of agreement and consent between the various factions, clans and sub clans, and is perceived to be guilty of clan favouritism. It has failed to re-establish the seat of government in Mogadishu;
- Aside from the Prime Minister’s bloc, many key figures in the TFG retain armed militias;
- A number of internal and external forces continue to exert control over the TFG’s various factions through a network of commanders that exist outside of the government’s orbit. President Abdullahi Yusuf, Mohamed Dheere, Abdi Qeybdiid and various regional and district administrations all have a stake in the TFG, as does Ethiopia. A significant proportion of the criminality rife throughout southern Somalia is linked to these forces, many of whom engage in violent acts against a defenceless civilian population;
- TFG forces have been responsible for a variety of attacks against civilians in Mogadishu, including widespread pillaging and looting of civilian property; rape; attacks on humanitarian workers; mass arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of detainees;
- The TFG has also failed to provide effective warnings to civilians of impending military operations, interfered with and sometimes obstructed delivery of humanitarian assistance, and repeatedly closed independent media outlets.
c. International Community
The international community’s stance is characterised by inertia and a lack of clarity. Its collective failure to push back on the US or other actors when they act contrary to the interests of reconciliation contributes to Somalia’s ongoing instability.
For instance, recent actions by the US (bombings in Somalia and the timing of its inflammatory designation of Al-Shabab as a terrorist organisation) were met by a collective silence from the international community.
The international community has also failed to censure Ethiopia for excessive use of force, to investigate credible allegations of war crimes, or to respond to the UN’s Special Representative’s appeal to end impunity in Somalia.
Somaliland
If Somalia is a state in name only, Somaliland is a state-in-waiting without formal recognition.
Of all of the states in the Horn of Africa, it is the self-declared yet internationally unrecognised aspirant state of Somaliland that offers President Bush with his most viable opportunity to claim an African success story. By all rational indicators of a state’s post-conflict development, Somaliland represents impressive progress, and consolidating an area of stability and governance in the Horn of Africa will reduce the vacant space for instability, conflict and extremism to fill.
Somaliland has achieved an extraordinary level of political and physical stability after being raised during the bitter civil war of the early 1990s. An embattled population found the resolve to reconstitute itself, establishing functioning organs of government without little upheaval – a rarity in post-conflict reconstruction. Its drive to create multi-party democracy upon a backdrop of relative peace and security has been impressive, if not without flaw.
Somaliland’s considerable achievements must not continue to go unheralded, and the only substantial way to reward it is through full statehood. Regional and international actors cannot tacitly assume that its position as a regional anchor of stability will endure indefinitely, as a number of latent spoilers could undermine progress. These include:
- Internal power struggles translating into violent clashes between armed militias;
- Public protests at the lack of tangible government achievements;
- Militant Islamist movements embedding themselves within the territory;
- Deepening conflict with Puntland;
- Armed conflict with TFG forces.
Somaliland’s claim for full state independence is distinct from the majority of similar requests of other separatist enclaves/exclaves. Rather than seeking to secede from Somalia, Somaliland is looking to be re-constituted as an independent state. It held this status for five days between 26 June and 1 July 1960 - being recognised by 35 states in the process - before voluntarily uniting with Italian Somalia within the Somali Republic.
Given the turmoil that characterises the bulk of Somalia, the international community needs to be reawakened from its torpor on Somaliland while relative calm exists, a calm that shows troubling signs of being disrupted by bomb attacks in the capital, Hargeisa, in April 2008 and the subsequent deployment of troops by the President. The policy vacuum needs to be filled by constructive engagement on the issue of Somaliland’s status at every diplomatic level, most notably within the African Union and United Nations. While this dialogue should necessarily be framed by the need for regional stability, the aim of some parties to establish a Somali Federation need not be an immediate focus of such discussions.