3.1 The failure to connect security and development policies
Security and development are two inseparable sides of the same reconstruction effort, and economic development is essential to long-term political stability. As such, development without security and the rule of law will result in Afghanistan again becoming a failed state, and security at the expense of development will not be sustainable. The current lack of security is a major impediment to development and reconstruction efforts in Kandahar province: international development agencies and Afghan aid organisations are unable to provide sufficient development aid due to the increasingly fragile security environment.
Infrastructure in Kandahar province remains poor and funds for rebuilding the vital agricultural sector are constrained, and ill-adapted alternative livelihood programmes have led to widespread public disillusionment. Consequently, the majority of Kandahar’s rural population continues to engage in opium cultivation to feed their families.
“The poppy farmers will fight hard to protect their only means of livelihood, and without roads and irrigation systems [to help them grow different products] you can hardly blame them. [Unless the farmers were given incentives to grow other crops] we’ll be stirring up a hornet’s nest”
Lieutenant-General David Richards
ISAF Commander in Kabul
(Source: The Times 26 June 2006)
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The precarious security situation and dearth of viable development alternatives in Kandahar is further entrenching the opium economy in Kandahar to such an extent that opium now represents the backbone of Kandahar’s economy. It is clear that opium lies at the heart of Afghanistan’s reconstruction nexus, and recent eradication efforts in Kandahar have impacted extremely negatively on security in the province.
In 2005, Kandahar had the second highest level of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan: a record 13,000 hectares, accounting for 12% of total poppy cultivation in the country. Producing an estimated 500 metric tons and generating US$5,400 per hectare, in 2005, Kandahar’s poppy fields yielded almost ten times more income than those from wheat.
Around 26,000 households or 160,000 people rely on opium poppy cultivation in Kandahar.
3.2 Counter-productive drug policies and public disillusionment
Although poppy cultivation has reached unprecedented levels in Kandahar province, alternative livelihood programmes are totally failing to address the opium crisis, and resources continue to be poured into aggressive strategies such as crop eradication.
Yet eradication is a militaristic counter-narcotics intervention that primarily affects the most vulnerable actors of Afghanistan’s opium economy, and reinforces farmers’ economic vulnerability. Farmers’ livelihoods are being
destroyed before social protection mechanisms and sustainable alternative economic opportunities are in place.
“Eradication without providing for meaningful alternative livelihoods is not sustainable.
Eradication does not hold promise as a near-term solution, and forcible eradication can be counter-productive.
Given the multi-dimensional nature of opium production in Afghanistan, counter-narcotics efforts should be mainstreamed into all aspects of development: security, economic growth and governance.
There are no quick and simple solutions.”
Ali Jalali
Former Afghan Interior Minister
May 2006
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In the spring of 2006 Afghan authorities (with strong support from the US and the UK) launched an aggressive eradication programme in Kandahar, involving Afghan counter-narcotics police officers, soldiers and other security forces.
Throughout 2006 US and UK-funded Poppy Elimination Programme (PEP) teams, comprising eight to ten Afghan and international experts and advisors, will remain in Kandahar to facilitate the eradication activities of provincial authorities. Currently, OEF forces provide significant support to Afghan forces engaged in eradication. This support includes the training of police officers and transport for eradication forces. Although ISAF troops are not permitted to take direct, pre-planned action against the opium trade in Kandahar,
in light of the Afghan Government’s limited counter-narcotics capacity in the province, it is entirely possible that Canadian Forces could be required to engage directly in eradication activities.
“Foreigners were with them [the Afghan National Army]. We don´t know which country they came from. They surrounded the area, they did not let anyone come near and then we were kicked out and forced to go very far. Then they started to eradicate the field. We didn´t even talk with those people.
It was Afghan people who eradicated but the foreigners were commanding the eradication.”
Farmer in Kandahar
May 2006
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There have been widespread allegations that the eradication process in Kandahar is corrupted at many levels. The inconsistent and unequal nature of eradication policies carried out by government and international forces has exacerbated resentment among the local population. In particular, locals view international troops as a purely military force, which together with the Afghan Government, embark on targeted forceful action against farmers and their families. Typically, eradication operations target those unable to afford bribes and those whose farms are located in highly visible locations.
3.3 Poppy eradication fuelling support for insurgents
While it has been reported that the Taliban is resorting to raids on un-cooperative rural Kandahar communities for food and shelter, the insurgents’ actual relationship with the local Kandahar population is more complex.
Although civilians resent the insurgency for amplifying provincial instability and for threatening local Shuras and schools, the Taliban and insurgents compare favourably to the current Government, which has not managed to enforce security in the province.
Increasingly, Kandahar locals see the resurgent Taliban as a powerful and organised political structure capable of enforcing law and order.
“When they came with the tractors to eradicate this area yesterday I told them that they just might as well drive the tractor over me because I can’t live anymore.
I have 15 members of the family to feed so it means you’re killing me. We don’t know what we should do.”
Farmer in Kandahar
Transcript of video footage of The Senlis Council
May 2006
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Insurgent groups have considerable tribal and family ties with the people of Kandahar. In the past, the Taliban ‘levied’ a son from each Kandahar family for their army, ensconcing themselves at the heart of Kandahar’s social network.
Intermarriages with families in the Pakistani provinces from which insurgents enter Afghanistan continue to strengthen these ties. In their attempts to establish their authority in Kandahar, insurgents employ both ‘carrots’ (protection from eradication operations) and ‘sticks’ (intimidation, burning down schools) against the locals.
Kandahar is currently so chaotic that insurgents’ projected strength and authority appeal to locals´ longing for law and order.
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