4.1 Canada bearing the brunt of America’s mission failures
According to the Canadian Government, the successful operation of the Kandahar PRT is their troops’ top priority. However, Canadian troops have been handed an impossible reconstruction mission: until Kandahar is secure, there can be no stability and there will be no reconstruction, and Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan will not be a success.
After more than four years of activity by OEF forces, Kandahar’s security situation has not significantly improved. Operation Enduring Freedom has not been able to stabilise the province, nor fully remove the presence and influence of the Taliban movement. If Operation Enduring Freedom had removed the Taliban and similar insurgent movements from Kandahar, the basic security and stability conditions necessary for reconstruction and economic development projects to prosper would be in place. Having failed to do so, Operation Enduring Freedom’s stabilisation and security mission will now fall to Canadian troops who will be operating under ISAF’s more limited “self-defence” rules of engagement.
Operation Enduring Freedom’s failure to secure and stabilise the province has meant that only very limited economic development has taken place in Kandahar since 2001. As such, the rural communities of Kandahar continue to depend to a very large extent on illegal poppy cultivation and opium production. The destruction of these livelihoods through eradication is stimulating popular unrest in Kandahar and fuelling support for insurgent groups. The deteriorating security situation, combined with high levels of corruption and the heavy-handed tactics of international troops, is further provoking local discontent with the government and the international community. As such, further direct or indirect involvement of Canadian troops in eradication operations will be a major factor in the success of the Canadian mission in Kandahar.
4.2 In the face of looming Canadian mission failure, a new approach is needed
Poppy cultivation in Kandahar links the three main issues that could cause Canada’s mission in Kandahar to fail. First, Canada’s current counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist roles under OEF are undermining the political objectives of stability, reconstruction and development. Second, direct or indirect involvement in eradication risks the lives of the Canadian soldiers and the success of the mission. Lastly, when Canadian troops eventually move to ISAF, Canada’s reconstruction and development objectives will be further undermined by ISAF’s supporting role in eradication-focused counter-narcotics policies.
4.3 Growing insurgency threats
Since the spring of 2005 Kandahar’s security has progressively deteriorated. Attacks by insurgent groups have increased significantly, and Kandahar is now in a state of prolonged, politically motivated violence between increasingly organised insurgent groups, and Afghan and international forces.
4.3.1 Insurgency evolution and trends
In recent months Afghanistan’s insurgency has grown and evolved. Attacks by non-state actors in Afghanistan have increased five-fold in less than four years: from a monthly average of just five in 2002, to at present on average, 25 attacks each month. The situation is even worse in the south of Afghanistan, where there has been a 600% increase in violent attacks in the last six months, and terrorism is now a pressing concern in Kandahar: the majority of terror attacks in Afghanistan occur in Kandahar and the bordering provinces. In 2005, Kandahar experience 76 significant security breaches. This year there have already been 95 major security breaches in Kandahar.
As part of their ongoing attempts to fill the region’s power vacuum, insurgents’ warfare tactics have evolved substantially. It is increasingly clear that insurgents are modelling on the insurgency in Iraq, as suicide attacks, assassinations and the use of remote controlled, hi-tech Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have surged both in number and in sophistication over the last few months. Suicide bombings are extremely successful in spreading terror and undermining government authority and credibility, as well as highlighting the fiction that Canadian Forces are ‘peacekeeping.’
Increasingly, insurgents are launching large and mid-scale attacks against police stations and army convoys involving several dozen combatants. While insurgents are experiencing significant casualties, this strategy is successfully damaging ANA and ANP control of, and support in Kandahar province. These tactics are forcing international forces to engage in large-scale war manoeuvres such as the current ‘Operation Mountain Thrust.’
Operation Mountain Thrust
This operation is OEF’s biggest offensive since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The operation, involving more than 11,000 Afghan and international troops (including 2,200 Canadians), commenced in mid-June and aims to quash Taliban and insurgent fighters in southern Uruzgan, north-eastern Helmand and north-western Kandahar
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Following the fall of the Taliban regime, reconstruction and development efforts focused on Kabul and the relatively benign northern Afghanistan, and largely ignored southern Afghanistan. Taliban remnants and other disaffected actors exploited this opportunity to regroup, and with the Afghan transitional Governments’ and international community’s attention focused elsewhere, insurgent groups became entrenched in the border provinces between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Consequently, Kandahar and Helmand effectively became ‘breeding grounds’ for anti-state actors. Increasingly, these Taliban remnants and anti-state actors are joining forces against the central government.
A new battle for Kandahar City?
Our interviewees in the city of Kandahar repeated rumours in the area that suggest the Taliban are planning a large-scale attack on their historic stronghold. Insurgents are stockpiling weapons in the provincial capital’s slums and finalising their strategy. Until now the presence of Canadian troops has deterred direct attacks on the city, with the Taliban preferring guerrilla-style tactics like suicide or roadside bombs. An all-out battle for Kandahar’s capital would signal a new level of intensity in Afghanistan’s latest war.
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The local population is highly politicized and intensely involved in political discussion especially since this directly affects their day to day security. The “propaganda” war in the area is a sophisticated one, and political discussions contain many elements related to local incidents involving the international community, but also the international political context for the foreign presence in Afghanistan.
Many of the interviewees discussed the foreign presence in Kandahar in a historic context of Muslims vs Christian. Many of them believe that the international presence in Afghanistan is related to a western interest to dominate the Muslim world and connect that to the invasion of Iraq. Many question American motives in Afghanistan and refer to an American desire to “take revenge against Afghans for the 9/11 death”. Others stated that they did not believe that internationals cared about Afghans dying, and declared that “Afghan blood is cheap”. Others consider the international development efforts in Afghanistan to be related to providing infrastructure for their military presence in Afghanistan and consider Karzai’s government as being treated by the international community as a “puppet government”.
Local Afghans are not familiar with the details of the aid efforts in the area - they were unaware for example that USAID pays for the diesel that provide electrical power in Kandahar city. Locals see the international community as disinterested in and disrespectful of Afghan and Islamic culture and traditions.
Some interviewees said that although they were initially supportive of the international presence in the south, they now look at them as the latest foreign occupation, which they will resist with violence if necessary. They see the next month as a time which will determine the future relationship of the coalition forces with Afghanistan.
Individuals often mentioned the level of poverty in the region and the deterioration of the economic situation in the area. Many individuals discussed leaving Kandahar, many individuals stated they would leave Kandahar if they were able to, but some do not have the financial means to do so.
During the day in Kandahar there is a decreasing number of women and children on the street, during the night even locals travel with caution.
Family relationships also have a bearing on whether there is support for the Taliban/insurgents in the area. In this province during the Taliban government there was a great deal of marriage with Arab and Pakistani elements and these family relationships are still relevant in the local political dynamics. The international presence in the south is seen as a “Christian/infidel” presence and often referred to in this way in interviews.
Young men interviewed had no employment and no prospect of employment. They were quick to become angry about many elements of their life, and therefore very susceptible to Taliban propaganda.
The return of Taliban control to the south is not simply a military phenomenon nor an “Al Qaeda” initiative. It represents a culmination of local and global economic, social and political factors. It has its first roots in local poverty, but it is fuelled by the perceived global dynamics between the “Muslim and Christian” world.
Figure 12: Increasing number of security breaches in Kandahar, 2005-2006
4.3.2 Insurgent groups operating in Kandahar
In the volatile Kandahar province, the term ‘insurgent’ has functioned as a catch-all term for politically motivated groups taking part in the action against the central government and foreign troops. The reality of Afghanistan’s insurgency is more complex however, encompassing a number of different groups, some indigenous and some foreign ‘Jihadists’, with divergent goals and backgrounds and military tactics. However, these groups share a common radical Islamist ethos and the goal of ousting Karzai’s Government. In recent months there have been clear indications of increasing coordination between different insurgent groups. Growing similarities between the tactics used show that insurgent groups are conducting joint efforts to gain territorial control over Kandahar and the south of Afghanistan.
Although Al Qaeda no longer has as firm a base in Afghanistan as it did under the Taliban regime, the group continues to exert influence in the country. On 22 June Al Qaeda’s second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahri released a video urging Afghans to join the insurgency against international forces in Afghanistan, and warning that ‘significant violence’ lies ahead in southern Afghanistan.
4.3.3 Civilian deaths
The field research in Kandahar revealed that the number of civilian deaths in the province has doubled from 2005 to 2006. Of the total number of fatalities for 2005 and the first half of 2006 (until the end of June 2006), civilian deaths represented an astonishing 22 percent of total fatalities. This equals the amount of Afghan security forces being killed in Kandahar. Table 7 shows the total amounts of fatalities for civilians, the Afghan security forces, international forces and the Taliban.
Table 7:Fatalities in Kandahar
| mmmmmmmmmmmmm |
2005 |
2006 |
Total for 2005 and 2006 |
Total number (%) |
| Civilians |
47 |
104 |
151 |
22% |
| Afghan National Army / Afghan National Police |
96 |
60 |
154 |
22% |
| International Forces |
13 |
10 |
23 |
3% |
| Taliban |
61 |
303 |
364 |
53% |
4.4 Phantom borders: the Durand Line
During their deployment to Kandahar, Canadian troops will have to succeed where Operation Enduring Freedom has already failed: it will be necessary to stabilise the ´phantom border´ between Kandahar and the Pakistani provinces of Quetta and Baluchistan. Following failures to improve the living conditions of the tribal people living in these areas, popular support for Al Qaeda and the Taliban is markedly increasing. However, until the Afghan and Pakistan Governments stop arguing over this arbitrary border, it is likely that Canadian troops will have a mission impossible on their hands in southern and eastern Kandahar.
Kandahar borders Pakistan’s unstable Quetta province, and is one of the most volatile parts of Afghanistan. During the 1990s, the Taliban used Kandahar as their main entry point into Afghanistan, and the province remains a Taliban and Al Qaeda stronghold. Mullah Dadullah, the former Taliban intelligence chief, allegedly commands the Taliban insurgency from a base in Quetta, Pakistan, and anti-government elements fully exploit the porous border, infiltrating and ex-filtrating Kandahar at leisure.
The border between Kandahar and Pakistan is an ongoing area of concern for Afghanistan, and has significantly contributed to the increasing instability. The border forms part of the so-called Durand Line, created by the British Indian Government in 1893 to divide the Afghan tribes, which at the time were a major concern for the British rulers of India. That border, never accepted by Afghanistan, is still in place and divides the Afghan Baloch and the Pashtun tribes on both sides of this technical barrier. Afghans still refer to some parts of the disputed territory on the other side of the border as South Pashtunistan.
Following the collapse of British India and the subsequent partitioning of India in 1947, the Durand Line became the actual border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, in 1949, the Afghan parliament unilaterally declared the border invalid, proclaiming that Afghanistan did not recognise the Durand Line as a legal boundary. Thus the border can best be described as a ´phantom border´, having important implications for the current security situation in Kandahar.
Pakistan continues to pressure Kabul and the regional tribes to accept the Durand Line as an official international border. The issue remains a source of tension between both countries as well as international forces in the region, but neither the Afghan nor the Pakistani Government has full control over the border areas. Pakistan wants to uphold the border as a barrier against the flow of Afghan refugees during periods of conflict. Canadian and American OEF forces seek a firm border against insurgents quartered in the Baloch region. However, the governor of Kandahar has only partial control over the tribal activities in this area and his Pakistani counterpart has even less control over what most local people see as Afghan territory.
The Pashtun people from Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas wish to secede from Pakistan, considering their territories to be part of Afghanistan.
4.5 Pakistan’s influence on security in Kandahar
The recent escalation of violence in Kandahar brought into question the role of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) in supporting Taliban actions. The Taliban has long-standing links with the ISI, and despite Pakistani denial, the Afghan Government has continued to accuse the Pakistani army of aiding and abetting the Taliban’s launch of attacks across the border in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s President Karzai recently said that “Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence trains young Afghans to burn down schools and attack engineers working in construction.” Kandahar’s Governor Assadullah Khalid has continuously denounced Taliban penetration from Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, claiming that “the suicide bombers are trained and equipped by Pakistan and then sent to Afghanistan for sabotage activities”.
The Pakistan military works closely with the Islamic parties which govern the two provinces that border Afghanistan, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. These political groups are long-standing supporters of the Taliban.
By interfering as little as possible with the support of these groups to the Taliban, Musharraf’s administration may be trying to ensure its political survival by keeping Islamic radicals on his side. However, according to the director general of the Pakistani ISI, Hamid Gul, although Pakistan has positioned 80,000 troops along the Durand Line, Pakistan is not able to police the Taliban in Pakistani territory: "The Americans cannot stop infiltration through the Mexican border - how can we stop it [with Afghanistan]? Especially as the Durand Line is just an imaginary border, not a physical border."
Pakistan’s Secret Service is not the only Pakistani force influencing Kandahar province. While historical and cultural elements may explain the interest of Islamabad in shaping Kandahar’s future, Pakistan also has a strong socio-economic influence on Kandahar. As Kandahar’s most important trade partner, Pakistan plays a key role in the province’s development. During trade agreement talks with Afghanistan in 2005, Pakistani authorities showed keen interest in setting up industrial zones between Kandahar and Jalalabad.
However, despite the potential for economic development, Pakistan’s influence has created hostility among the Kandahar population. The ISI’s support for the Taliban has led to several demonstrations around Pakistan’s consulate in Kandahar City. Kandahar locals have particularly resented the arrival of hundreds of Pakistani workers, engaged in Afghanistan’s huge road-building projects. These Pakistanis have better road-construction skills, and are paid more than Afghan workers. To some extent, Kandahar locals hold Pakistan responsible for the high level of unemployment in Kandahar province, and Pakistani workers have been targeted and killed in recent months.
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