2.1 Canada in Afghanistan: a response to an American call to arms
Canada has a large and impressive history of military deployments abroad to defend the ideals of freedom and democracy. The Canadian military’s commitment to Afghanistan is another chapter in that long tradition of important contributions to countries or people in need. The Canadian forces on the ground are fully committed to improving security and stability in southern Afghanistan and will continue to do so at least until 2009. Canadians should be proud of the heroic and dedicated performance of their military personnel in Kandahar.
Like the majority of the international community present in Afghanistan, Canada’s initial involvement in Afghanistan came as a response to the acts of terrorism against the United States in September 2001. Canadian Forces have been involved in Afghanistan since late 2001, performing security, reconstruction and development duties over four main deployments. The Canadian Department of National Defence says that through its participation in the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Canada’s overarching goal in Afghanistan is to prevent it from relapsing into a failed state that gives terrorist organisations a safe haven.
Following the fall of the Taliban, successive Canadian governments defined their involvement in Afghanistan as reconstruction, peacekeeping and democracy building. Over the last fifty years, Canada has played a major role in international peacekeeping operations. “Peacekeeping” has become entrenched in Canada’s national identity and serves as the cornerstone for the great majority of Canadian military interventions throughout the world.
The presence of Canadian troops in Afghanistan has thus been closely associated with previous Canadian engagements in other conflict regions. The Canadian Government continues to emphasise the ‘peacekeeping’ objective of Canada’s current mission, represented by the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar (PRT).
The first stated purpose of Canada’s current Kandahar mission was to promote a level of stability that will allow development actors to start operating through the Kandahar PRT. Canada’s long-term objective in Afghanistan mirrors that of NATO´s ISAF: to support the Afghan government to extend the rule of law throughout the country, and thereby provide the conditions necessary for effective reconstruction and development. However, Kandahar’s rapidly deteriorating security situation is making it impossible to achieve these objectives, and is both forcing Canadian troops further away from their traditional peace-keeping role, and tarnishing Canada’s reputation as effective peacekeepers. While the Canadian forces on the ground are doing their best to improve the situation in southern Afghanistan, the current problematic policy environment renders their operational tasks increasingly difficult.
Rather than coordinating relatively peaceful reconstruction and development projects, Canada is currently in command of the multinational brigade portion of the Kandahar-based US-led, war-fighting coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom. Although Canadian troops are due to transfer to NATO command in July 2006, it is likely that ordinary Afghans (like ordinary Canadians) will find it almost impossible to distinguish between the Operation Enduring Freedom troops and the NATO-led peace-building and stabilisation forces.
2.2 Conflicting objectives of military operations
The two major military operations in Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – have significant differences in the operations objectives. They have different legal base, different mission mandates and rules of engagement, different mission objectives; and to a large extent they have operated in different areas of Afghanistan.
2.2.1 Legal bases
US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led ISAF mission do not have equal legitimacy under international law. Operation Enduring Freedom operates in Afghanistan under the guise of ‘national self-defence’, whereas ISAF was specifically mandated by the UN to assist the Afghan interim administration in securing the country.
The initial legal basis for Operation Enduring Freedom came from two UN Security Council resolutions, and the self-defence-focused Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, which was invoked unanimously by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 2 October 2001.
The International Security Assistance Force was created in December 2001 in accordance with the Bonn Conference, and operates under a UN mandate. ISAF is not a UN force, it is a ‘coalition of the willing’ whose mission was initially limited to Kabul. In August 2003, NATO took command of ISAF, and a UN Security Council Resolution in October 2003 paved the way for ISAF to support the Government of Afghanistan in regions beyond Kabul.
Is there a proper international legal basis for Operation Enduring Freedom?
The current legality of Operation Enduring Freedom is highly questionable. It is arguable that Operation Enduring Freedom’s self-defence raison d’être no longer applies. In 2001 it was indeed logical for the US to invoke the above-mentioned self-defence clause of Article 5 as the basis to invade Afghanistan, because Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban regime clearly supported and harboured the Al Qaeda movement responsible for the September 11 attacks in the United States. Operation Enduring Freedom was designed to remove these elements so as to avoid similar attacks in the future. However, five years on, Operation Enduring Freedom continues to operate under the legal flag of self-defence, yet the situation on the ground in Afghanistan has changed completely.
The Taliban regime has been removed and replaced by a democratically elected government. The remnants of the Taliban, related groups and new insurgent actors currently operating in Afghanistan no longer have clear ties to Al Qaeda or a clear relationship to those that undertook the 9/11 attacks.
The insurgent movement currently operating in Afghanistan can be described as the neo-Taliban, and comprises a loose collection of several groups that either benefit from local communities’ support or have access to support from external sources (such as funding and recruitment from abroad), and operate somewhat independently of each other. As such, the focus of the military missions necessary to counter these new threats has changed from “pre-emptive” international self-defence, to countering and removing destabilising factions in Afghanistan.
It is clear that the original legal basis of Operation Enduring Freedom has disappeared. With NATO troops in the process of replacing the outdated Operation Enduring Freedom in most of Afghanistan, the situation in southern Afghanistan is particularly problematic. ISAF is designed to stabilise and reconstruct Afghanistan, and has no legal mandate to actively track down and target the neo-Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan. Although ISAF troops can support the Afghan Government’s counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency missions, they are only allowed to act in self-defence against these forces. Targeted military action against the Taliban and other insurgents will remain the exclusive domain of the Afghan security forces and Operation Enduring Freedom. As such, ISAF forces operating in southern Afghanistan will be operating in a legal quagmire, where their legal basis precludes addressing on-the-ground realities, which are increasingly dictating active engagement with insurgents.
2.2.2 Objectives
Although the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom missions contain overlaps in terms of overall goals, their core objectives have major differences. Operation Enduring Freedom is a combat mission, and its coalition forces are primarily responsible for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations to eliminate the Taliban and Al Qaeda, in order to build the security foundation necessary for reconstruction and development.
There have been numerous questions and discussions in the various coalition countries regarding the mission objective of the various international military forces in Afghanistan and Canada is no exception.
“Nothing is changing when Canadian troops go from Enduring
Freedom to NATO. No units change. Nothing actually changes.
It is all the same. There will not be one iota of change except that
we will be under NATO command instead of Enduring Freedom.
Nothing will change.”
The Honourable Gordon O’Conner
Canadian Minister of Defence
17 May 2006
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Operation Enduring Freedom’s main objective in Kandahar is countering terrorism, through targeted strikes and the ‘hunting down’ of terrorists. As such, OEF has had limited impact in southern Afghanistan in terms of reconstruction, and has not focused on establishing and rooting control and development structures in Kandahar. Moreover, the Operation’s mandate has been disconnected from local realities: Operation Enduring Freedom has not adjusted its military effort to meet local civilian needs, and Operation Enduring Freedom forces have largely eschewed meaningful interaction with the local population.
The US-led Operation’s militaristic approach has exacerbated negative public perceptions of foreigners, and Operation Enduring Freedom has not helped enhance the central government’s authority in Kandahar. Overall, Operation Enduring Freedom has not significantly improved security in the region. Indeed Operation Enduring Freedom and US activities in the region, have resulted in creating an environment that facilitated the resurgence of Taliban/insurgent elements rather than their stated mission objective of ridding Afghanistan of those elements.
““I am deeply disturbed that there has been no acknowledgement
that there is indeed a difference and that it makes any
difference whether we are there under a NATO led mission or
whether we are there under Operation Enduring Freedom. I just
about fell over when the Defence minister stated that he considers the NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom missions as being the same.”
Ms. Alexa McDonough MP (Halifax, NDP)
During House of Commons debate on the extension of
Canada´s mission to Afghanistan
May 2006
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Many Afghans interviewed, including members of the Afghan government and members of the international community present in Afghanistan, have expressed this view privately but state that, due to the American position in Afghanistan, they are not willing to initiate a public discussion on this dynamic.
“Collateral Damage”: the bombing of Azizi village in Kandahar
On 22 May 2006, a bombing raid carried out by Operation Enduring Freedom forces in Kandahar killed Taliban forces and at least sixteen civilians. The bombing raid on the village of Azizi followed some of the worst violence in Afghanistan since 2001, and was one of the biggest air strikes since the start of the Operation Enduring Freedom.
Eyewitnesses say at least 30 civilians were killed, including women and children, but OEF spokespeople have accused the insurgents of deliberately hiding behind civilians, and continue to blame the Taliban for these civilian deaths. OEF maintains that rebel commanders should be held responsible for the civilian deaths.
However, it is clear that the local population blames the Operation Enduring Freedom troops. Some claimed that Operation Enduring Freedom forces did not allow emergency services into the village to assist the wounded, and popular resentment against Operation Enduring Freedom forces has escalated.
Mullahs and religious leaders were present in the Mirwais hospital in Kandahar City following the attack to comfort and assist the injured and their families. No representatives of the central government or the international community were reported to have come to the assistance of the injured civilians or their families.
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In contrast, NATO-led ISAF is effectively a peacekeeping, stabilization mission, whose role, according to NATO spokeswoman Sue Eagles, is to “support the Government of Afghanistan, to extend security and stability and the rule of good governance and the rule of law.” The ISAF mission has been described as aiming to “prevent Afghanistan reverting to ungoverned space which could harbour terrorism; build security and Government institutions so that the progress of recent years becomes irreversible, and to enable eventual international disengagement; and, support efforts to counter the growth of narcotics production and trafficking.”
After his October 2005 visit to Kabul, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that ISAF would expand on this original role, and take on counter-insurgency operations as it moves into southern Afghanistan. However, critics such as former German Minister of Defence Peter Struck have condemned this role expansion as fundamentally changing NATO’s role in Afghanistan, making the situation for NATO troops doubly dangerous. “NATO is not equipped for counterterrorism operations. That is not what it is supposed to do.”
2.2.3 Confusion over Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement set the parameters within which national forces operate and are key to determining how mission objectives will be achieved. Given their different objectives, the Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF missions have different rules of engagement, and although the exact rules are confidential, some details have been made available. Under Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, attacking insurgents can be shot at and pursued, but under ISAF rules of engagement, “insurgents will not be pursued because that constitutes counter-terrorist activity.”
Canadian troops currently serve under the commands of both Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan and operate under two different sets of rules of engagement. It is this feature of Canadian involvement – participation in two separate and conflicting military operations – that makes the Canadian mission in Kandahar particularly dangerous and doomed to failure. The Canadian political leadership has failed to clarify the true nature of the Canadian military mission, and the troops themselves are uncertain.
Prior to the most recent deployment in February 2006, the Canadian mission was pitched to the Canadian public as a ‘peacekeeping’ ISAF mission rather than ‘peace-making’ or counter-insurgency mission. However, Canada’s top military commander General Rick Hillier has promised that Canadian troops will be targeting ‘detestable murderers’ and ‘scumbags’, and another senior Canadian officer has said that "in Canada, it's clear that this is not a peacekeeping mission.”
The new ISAF commander Lieutenant General Richards statements have further complicated the issue, saying “ISAF does not have a counterterrorist role; [Counterterrorism] will remain a US-only operation […] Our underpinning purpose is not a counter-terrorist mission.”
2.2.4 Areas of operation
Operation Enduring Freedom is currently carrying out counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency activities in the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and also operates a number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In the summer of 2006 the main American component of Operation Enduring Freedom will withdraw from the southern provinces, and the Canadian-led multinational component of OEF will be incorporated into ISAF.
Table 2: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
PRTs are military-civilian institutions with the following objectives:
- Strengthening and extending the authority of the Central Government;
- Assisting in establishing stability and security;
- Enabling reconstruction and facilitating the coordination and division of labour between civilian and military actors, including by delivering projects;
- Providing professional expertise and facilitating the work of NGOs and other actors by improving the security situation.
The civilians involved are typically engineers, mechanics and other specialists, while military members are responsible for meeting immediate and long-term security requirements. In many parts of Afghanistan, the PRT model has been an innovative and effective model for stabilisation efforts. The combination of civil and military personnel facilitates a shared sense of purpose, security, and development among post-conflict stakeholders. However, the model is vulnerable to differing national styles: OEF and ISAF-led PRTs function very differently, particularly with regard to the civil-military balance. This aspect is highlighted when control of PRTs changes, shifting the civil-military balance.
To be successful, PRTs require certain levels of political stability, infrastructure and support from NGOs and other civic actors, in order to build bridges with local communities and to deliver development projects effectively.
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ISAF currently operates in Kabul, the northern and the western regions of Afghanistan, and its forces are responsible for providing security assistance in more than 50% of Afghanistan's territory. ISAF has operational control over nine PRTs and in the coming months, ISAF will replace the withdrawing US elements of Operation Enduring Freedom in the southern provinces. According to NATO’s Operational Plan for its work in Afghanistan, ISAF will eventually operate throughout the entire country.
2.2.5 Counter–narcotics mandates
The eradication of poppy is one of Operation Enduring Freedom’s priorities. According to commanders of OEF, “the US Department of Defense counter-narcotics [eradication-focused] program in Afghanistan is a key element of our campaign against terrorism.” Under the umbrella of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US military plays a significant role in attacking traffickers and their installations, and the US Government continues to provide assistance for eradication and law enforcement.
For ISAF and NATO, responsibility for drug policy lies with the Afghan Government, assisted by the UK as the lead nation on drug policy. ISAF is mandated to assist the Afghan Government in several ways to combat drugs, and if ISAF forces find illegal drugs during their military operations, they can store these drugs until they can be handed over to the Afghan authorities. However, ISAF has no authority to destroy poppy crops or harvests, or to take independent action against drug producers.
2.3 Canada’s failing mission in Kandahar
In order to assist the Afghan Government and stabilise the Kandahar region, in mid-2005 Canada took over command of a US-led PRT in Kandahar. This reflects the strong commitment of the Canadian government and the Canadian military to increase its assistance to Afghanistan. Ideally, the Canadian PRT will extend security and development to this key province, promote central government policies and priorities with local authorities, and help Afghans to create a secure environment to facilitate the delivery of basic services like schooling, road maintenance and basic medical care in the region.
Operating from Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City, Canada’s PRT comprises approximately 250 soldiers and includes representatives from Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). These civilian representatives are intended to work under the team's military leadership to provide diplomatic, development, defence and other support to the country and co-ordinate humanitarian and reconstruction projects throughout the province of Kandahar, also ensuring that operations respect religious, ethnic and cultural sensitivities.
Although Canadian troops based at the Kandahar PRT are liaising with civilian contractors and are conducting deterrence patrols on road construction sites in the province, CIDA’s budget for the PRT is less than US$5 million. According to public reports only one development programme (to enhance local confidence in Kandahar’s governance institutions) has been started since Canada took control of the PRT last year. Critics of the PRT mission warn that Canadian soldiers could face dangers in Kandahar similar to those seen by American forces in Iraq.
“The challenges are enormous. There are no quick fixes and success
cannot be assured by military means alone.”
The Right Honourable Stephen Joseph Harper
Prime Minister of Canada
17 May 2006
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Canada’s “Confidence in Government” Programme
Canada’s Confidence in Government Programme, introduced in Kandahar’s Shah Wali Kot district in May 2006, is described as a “uniquely Canadian approach” to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The programme seeks to extend the reach of and support for the central government in Kabul to the rural areas by responding to the development concerns of local communities.
To this end, the Confidence in Government Programme will fund development projects which have been identified through consultations with local councils and tribal elders. Local councils and tribal elders are encouraged to discuss with their local communities how development funds from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) should be spent in their local area. Projects thus identified would be implemented by CIDA.
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When Canada took command of the Kandahar PRT, the troops made efforts to distinguish themselves from the American OEF troops in Kandahar, who are viewed by locals with extreme hostility. However, the initial goodwill generated by these attempts quickly evaporated.
According to the Canadian Department of National Defence, the majority of Canadian soldiers in Kandahar (at least 2,000) work solely with the US army in patrols and security work, and do not carry out much reconstruction or development work.
Despite the excellent performance of Canadian military forces abroad, some locals stated that they see the Canadian troops as overly aggressive, indifferent, militaristic and lacking communication skills. Insurgents’ guerrilla fighting has forced the Canadians into a heavily armed posture that alienates the people: Canadian convoys race at top speed through Kandahar, “like mice running from hole to hole” according to locals.
Our interviewees stated that the Canadian Prime Minister travelled to Kandahar but went directly from the airport to the military base. They stressed Prime Minister Harper´s failure to properly meet with locals in accordance with Afghan customs, or to speak to them about their views of the Canadian presence in the province.
This was widely remarked upon as improper, insulting to Afghan pride, and an indication of cowardice on his part.
Incidents, such as the March shooting of a taxi passenger for driving too close to a Canadian military vehicle and the lack of a proper local response to that incident, have caused deep hostility in the community specifically directed at the Canadians present in the region.
Creating additional difficulties for the Canadian troops is that the majority of the military vehicles and convoys travel without flags, preventing differentiation between the actions of US, Canadian military and the Private Military Companies involved in poppy eradication (DynCorp). Because of this, and because foreign military elements have been reportedly involved in the recent forced poppy eradication campaigns, many Kandahar locals believe that the Canadian military are complicit in the recent US-supported eradication activities.
Although almost without exception the local actors from the international community are deeply concerned about the living conditions and future of the local population, many of them privately expressed their inability to produce positive results for the region given the dynamics between local and the US military and counter-narcotics operations. Hamstrung by the lack of clarity on objectives and priorities, and lack of sufficient personnel and resources, there is little these dedicated and hard working individuals can achieve in this region. Additionally the generalised hostility against foreigners makes the security situation extremely difficult for those foreigners who would like to work on aid projects in the region.
In Kandahar City itself foreign aid workers live in security compounds, travel to work in offices in secured compounds and rarely travel on the street of Kandahar or out into the villages. When they do, most travel in convoys with armoured vehicles and highly visible armed escorts which creates further tension and distance with the local population. The number of NGO organization operating in Kandahar has dropped dramatically in the last year.
The effectiveness of PRTs depends on a number of preconditions, including a high level of political stability, the support of NGOs and other civil society actors, and basic infrastructure in the area of their operation. In Kandahar province, these necessary factors are absent: formal governance structures in the province are extremely weak and rapidly faltering, and increasing insurgency activity has prompted power vacuums in several of the districts.
In addition, an atmosphere of distrust and hostility towards the presence of Canadian troops prevails, further complicating efforts to implement the objectives of the PRT. Finally, after more than twenty-five years of war, most of Kandahar’s infrastructure remains badly damaged despite recent attempts at reconstruction. Therefore, the effectiveness of the PRT in Kandahar is questionable considering the absence of a number of elementary requirements.
2.4 Canadians at war: paying the price for following the US
Despite repeated calls for clarification and evidence to the contrary, the former and current Canadian Governments both insisted that Canada is in Kandahar under the auspices of NATO to carry out reconstruction work. In fact, rather than a post-conflict peace-building arena, Kandahar is now a province at war.
For the past eight months Canadian troops have been fighting ever more deadly counter-insurgency operations under the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom against increasingly powerful insurgent groups and the Taliban. The ongoing debate in Canada’s House of Commons regarding the precise role of Canadian troops in Kandahar prompted the Minister of Defence to declare that the OEF and the ISAF missions are effectively identical.
In attempting to counter the insurgency in Kandahar, Canadian troops are shifting significantly away from their traditional and accustomed role as peacekeepers, and are now heavily engaged in waging war against largely unidentifiable enemies.
Rather than assisting in the reconstruction and development of Kandahar province, 2,000 Canadian troops have been tasked with containing and quashing increasingly powerful and confident insurgents in one of the largest provinces of Afghanistan. Rising concerns over Canadian involvement in the transfer of captured insurgents to known human rights abusers highlight just how far Canadian troops are moving away from their traditional peacekeeping role.
“This is not a traditional peacekeeping mission”
The Right Honourable Peter Gordon MacKay
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs
17 May 2006
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Canada has a reputation for being highly respectful of international treaties and international cooperation, and has a long tradition of peacekeeping interventions in global conflicts. However, Canada’s transfer of prisoners in Afghanistan to human rights abusers has left Canadian troops open to prosecution for abuses of human rights. Unless this situation is swiftly resolved, Canada’s neglect of the Geneva Conventions will negatively affect its reputation and weaken the capacity of Canadian troops to achieve their objectives in Kandahar province.
| Table 3: Canadian fatalities in Afghanistan (as of June 21, 2006) |
| Date |
Casualties |
Cause |
Location |
| 18 April 02 |
4 soldiers |
Friendly fire |
Kandahar |
| 02 Oct 03 |
1 soldier |
Landmine explosions |
Kabul |
| 27 Jan 04 |
1 soldier |
Suicide attack |
Kabul |
| 24 Nov 05 |
1 soldier |
Armoured vehicle (LAV III) roll-over |
Kandahar |
| 15 Jan 06 |
1 diplomat |
Suicide attack |
Kandahar |
| 02 Mar 06 |
2 soldiers |
Armoured vehicle (LAV III) crash |
Kandahar |
| 29 Mar 06 |
1 soldier |
Fire fight |
Kandahar |
| 22 Apr 06 |
4 soldiers |
Roadside bomb |
Kandahar |
| 17 May 06 |
1 soldier |
Combat |
Kandahar |
2.5 The treatment of prisoners: a breakdown of Canadian ideals?
In December 2005, Canada’s Chief of Defence General Hillier signed a Prisoner Transfer Agreement with the Afghan Ministry of Defence.
The Agreement details the legal basis for transferring prisoners from Canadian Forces’ custody to any detention facility operated by the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, making Afghans responsible for detainees. Although Article 3 of the Agreement affirms that “the Participants will treat detainees in accordance with the standards set out in the Third Geneva Convention,” legal experts believe that because the arrangement does not adequately guarantee detainees’ protection and rights, Canadian soldiers may well be at risk of prosecution in the international arena. "Whoever negotiated this Agreement did our soldiers a great disservice […] The mere fact there is a possibility for Canadian troops to be charged demonstrates how fundamentally flawed this detainee transfer arrangement is."
Canada’s Prisoner Transfer Agreement does not protect Canadian troops from facing charges of war crimes.
While inspired by a similar agreement between the Netherlands and Afghanistan, the Canadian agreement contains far fewer protections for captured insurgents, leaving them open to torture and other abuses. Unlike the Dutch Agreement, Canada’s Agreement does not oblige the Afghan authorities to supply detainees’ names to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and in March 2006 the US State Department confirmed that Afghan authorities are known to routinely torture detainees. Nor does the Agreement prohibit the transfer of detainees to third parties, allowing the possibility that prisoners leaving Canadian custody could end up in US custody in Guantanamo Bay.
International human rights organisations have heavily criticised the US for violating prisoners’ rights. It is likely that Canadian Forces can be considered legally responsible for the abuse of prisoners, not only when they are transferred into Afghan custody, but also if they are sent onward to a third nation, such as the US.
The Canadian Government has remained vague about the actual status it accords to insurgents captured in Kandahar.
Although it recently affirmed that while “Taliban are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, they are entitled to prisoner-of-war treatment,” and claims that Canada treats all prisoners according to the Geneva standards; it has not substantively addressed Parliament’s concerns over the Prisoner Transfer Agreement. Recently, Canadian Forces’ Second in Command Lieutenant General Michel Gauthier appeared to confirm the Government’s position, claiming that “captured fighters don’t deserve these rights because it is not a war between countries.”
These ambiguities over Canadian Forces’ treatment and transfer of detainees are degrading Canada’s image and reputation as a fair, law-abiding and peace-seeking nation. The recent threat of terrorist attacks on Canada shows that Canada is increasingly seen as a ‘top priority’ enemy.
2.6 Collateral Damage: the death of Nasrat Ali Hassan
On 14 March 2006, Canadian soldiers in Kandahar shot and killed a passenger in Kandahar City.
Nasrat Ali Hassan, a father of six, was travelling home with his family after an evening visiting relatives.
A spokesman for the Canadian Forces Lt. Col. Derek Basinger commented that “our rules do not allow any Afghans to come within a certain distance of our patrols.” Afghans interviewed in Kandahar stated they had not been informed of any such rules.
Lt. Col. Basinger said that Mr Ali Hassan was not treated at the Canadian base because the Canadian troops on the scene believed his wounds were not life-threatening Mr. Hassan was taken to the Kandahar hospital and died hours later.
Mr Ali Hassan’s funeral was attended by a large crowd of local people who came out in support of his family, and the story of his death spread quickly through Kandahar.
So far, the family has not received a formal apology from Canadian representatives which is necessary under Afghan customs, nor has the Canadian government offered support to the family. This incident and the lack of an apology or compensation was
mentioned repeatedly in interviews in Kandahar about the communites current negative perception of the Canadian presence in Kandahar
Instead, such incidents prompt further support for the insurgent groups that are currently fighting the international forces. At the same time, Canada has wholly failed to properly deal with the issue of civilian deaths in Kandahar, while it has become clear that without solid local support, both stability and security will remain an illusion.
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