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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Helmand in a state of war
According to our definition and observations on the ground, Helmand is in a state of war, once again. The nature of instability in Helmand has shifted from random insurgency to a state of prolonged and organised violence that threatens the very foundations of the new Afghanistan. The nature of the insurgency has changed and is now perceived by the local population in south Afghanistan as the accepted power holder. Increasing levels of extreme poverty and violence have led to a critical point in Afghanistan’s instability. A violent struggle between insurgents and the legitimate actors for control and order in Helmand is now underway.
Different factors have contributed to this shift. The most prominent of these are rampant multidimensional poverty and structural dependence on the illegal opium-based economy; the disillusionment of the population; weak and receding government and international control; and the consolidation and sophistication of the insurgency. This new context signals a need for a radical change in the stabilisation strategy of the international troops to be deployed in Helmand.
The extreme level of poverty, a critical factor of instability
Illegal opium/heroin trafficking represents half of the local economy. But opium is more than a commodity: it is a currency, an instrument for access to land and credit. No crop matches the economic advantages and agronomic properties of the opium poppy; a factor rendered even more relevant in the arid climate and barren landscape of Helmand.
Substitution crop programmes have failed to address the deep economic reliance of rural communities on illegal opium. Opium is the lever for access to land and credit for the poorest farmers. The much championed "Alternative Livelihood" programmes are often disjointed from the real needs and resources of these communities. Cases of mismanaged and/or undelivered alternative development programmes have left farmers in even deeper poverty. Unsuccessful programmes have also contributed to reinforcing the perceptions among the local population that the international community and central government have failed to improve lives in rural Helmand. The few success stories of the development effort are lost in the overall negative perceptions of the international community.
Aggressive eradication operations exacerbate poverty and instability
Aggressive crop eradication operations contribute to the acceleration of the deteriorating situation in Helmand. In the extremely volatile context of Helmand, eradication operations intensified the local power games and alliance between all power players including the international community, the central government, the governors, the police, the army, local warlords, drug barons, Taliban, al-Qaeda. The poorest and most vulnerable farmers are pawns in the middle unable to escape grinding poverty and indebtedness.
Such operations have turned the people of Helmand against the international military and the central government. In the thick of the reality on the ground, the distinction between security forces directly engaged in eradication and those just providing support is not pertinent anymore. Foreign troops and the central government became the aggressing force in the eyes of the local population.
Forced eradication has also provided a tactical advantage to the insurgency. The Taliban offer farmers protection from eradication operations in exchange for support, further strengthening their grip on rural Helmand. There are numerous examples of Taliban mining fields to cause casualties and destruction among the eradication forces.
The growing divide between the population and the international stabilisation effort
Few of the promises made by the international community in 2001 and 2002 have translated into an improvement of the local population's daily lives. Moreover, forceful operations like crop eradication contribute to further alienate the population from the reconstruction effort.
The shift of perceptions among the people of Helmand has been dramatic and twofold: the international troops initially seen as liberators are now increasingly regarded as the invaders; and the Taliban until recently remembered as oppressors, are now becoming protectors.
The insurgency is using lawlessness to a higher end: winning control of Helmand and the broad south, and restoring an extreme ‘Islamic’ order. Their attacks on girls' schools in Afghanistan illustrate the attempt by the Taliban to become providers of social norms and practices.
On the other hand, the international troops have missed the chance, provided by the 2001 liberation, to show that the West could closely cooperate with a Muslim country. The religious divide is shaping local perceptions: the population increasingly sees themselves as Muslims oppressed by Christian troops. The Taliban and other groups are focusing their propaganda on this theme in order to deepen the antagonism between the Afghan population and the international community.
Third parties further undermine the integrity of Helmand
The absence of territorial integrity in Helmand is another critical issue in the instability of the province. The border between Helmand and Pakistan is merely a nominal border that exists on maps more so than on the ground. Tribal and ethnic ties, along with strong cross border economic activities, between Helmand and Pakistan, provide the ideal terrain for foreign militia groups with sanctuaries in Pakistan to launch attacks in Helmand. At the same time Pakistani elements play a disruptive role and take advantage of the increase of attacks against international troops to send mixed messages on the development of safe havens for the insurgency.
Local corruption and lack of pro-poor policies undermine the Karzai government legitimacy
The local perceptions of the endemic corruption of the local administration undermines the credibility of the Karzai government. Furthermore, if the Karzai government has acquired its legality through democratic elections, it has failed to secure a real legitimacy with the rural population in southern Afghanistan. The inability of the central government to resist unpopular policies and military operations of its international backers further reinforces the perceptions of a weak government, at odds with the expectations of the real people.
Multidimensional poverty and extreme violence in southern Afghanistan represent a direct threat to the achievements of the Bonn process. Afghanistan is facing a new fork in the road: the recent riots in Kabul show the need for the new democratic institutions to deliver meaningful policies to the population.
It is in the interest of everybody (the international community and neighbouring countries) that the Karzai government and the Parliament are able to assert domestic leadership and meet the expectations of the local population. The failure of some elements of the international community to support the Karzai administration to become a popular government for all the people of Afghanistan can lead to the failure of the collective reconstruction effort, ultimately representing a major set back for the war against global terrorism.
The main issue at stake is the government's ability, together with its international allies, to regain the people's trust with sound development and security policies, a realistic approach to the opium problem and a more attentive ear to Afghanistan’s local needs. The battle of hearts and minds in Helmand, and in Afghanistan at large, is still open.
Recommendations can be drawn from those conclusions:
Recommendation I
The reconstruction agenda should be designed for the poor, not a Western agenda mainly focusing on democratic institutions and the rule of law. Multidimensional poverty represents a direct threat to the achievements of the Bonn process. Afghanistan is facing a new fork in the road: the recent riots in Kabul show the need for the new democratic institutions to deliver meaningful, pro-poor, policies to the population.
The President and his cabinet should be given more autonomy to formulate critical development and security Afghan policies and allocate aid resources. A true and democratic Afghan leadership that would be respected by all Afghans is the best response to the threat of extremism.
Recommendation II
No attack should be conducted against the livelihoods of poor rural communities: all opium crop eradication operations must stop. Illegal opium must be tackled without rural communities descending further into poverty and by offering sustainable and adapted economic alternatives. The licensing of opium for the production of essential medicines should be given serious considerations as a way to meet the economic needs of the farmers and to combat illegal opium trafficking alongside targeted interdiction operations. It also provides the opportunity for the formal Afghan institutions to integrate the strong, local and informal governance structures in a comprehensive opium licensing control system that meets the needs of the local population. A sustainable, predictable and grass-roots development effort is necessary to meet the local needs of the population.
Recommendation III
More clarity must be given to the international military missions deployed in Afghanistan – the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and the NATO-led ISAF. Their specific targets and contributions to reconstruction efforts are not clear, whilst rules of engagement lack transparency.
The Afghan government needs to be associated more closely with the strategic and tactical operations of the international missions. This is particularly important in the selection of targets for aerial bombardment. Casualties among local communities have caused a great deal of bitterness and distrust towards foreign forces.
Recommendation IV
British troops in Helmand should adopt a new stabilisation doctrine, to reverse the negative legacy of the OEF operations in Helmand and break the vicious circle of violence. They must balance a robust and well-targeted use of force, with a far-reaching development effort. A peaceful and sustainable outcome in Helmand, and in Afghanistan at large, cannot be determined only by military means – comprehensive and long-term development efforts must be instigated which take into account the needs of the local population.
Recommendation V
The international community, together with the Afghan government and its regional partners, should develop a more assertive strategy to tackle the problem of insurgent safe heavens in Pakistan. In his recent report on Afghanistan, Dr. Barnett Rubin makes a series of recommendations for a strategy with Pakistan: the Pakistani government should offer full cooperation in isolating the Taliban insurgency; the US must acknowledge the democratization of Pakistan as key to the security of Afghanistan; cross-border Pashtun tribes should be given the opportunity to participate in the development and stabilisation efforts in the region.
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