In the localised province of Helmand, insurgency patterns have undergone a substantial
shift from disturbances to open warfare. For the local population, the insurgents have now
become the de facto established power holders.
People affiliated with every side of the conflict have been interviewed, providing unique
insights into the reality of life in Helmand. A complex set of factors have been identified as
the main contributors to Helmand’s descent into a state of war.
There are a number of structural factors which render the region prone to instability.
Helmand is made up of a barren desert-like landscape with a very arid climate. The main
cultivation and transport areas are located in the valley of the Helmand River. Thirty years
of conflict have almost entirely destroyed the irrigation infrastructure. The lack of roads,
schools and hospitals also hinders progress in the province, which is one of the poorest of
Afghanistan. The economy in Helmand is entirely rural, unemployment is rife and opium
poppy represents the main source of revenue. In such bleak conditions insurgency finds
fertile ground for recruitment against a government which has failed to bring economic
development and security in the region. The phantom border with Pakistan is another
structural factor for Helmand’s fragility, allowing insurgents to infiltrate and exfiltrate at
leisure. Due to geographical and tribal associations with neighbouring Pakistan, the Afghan
central government struggles to retain local allegiance.
In addition to these structural factors which render Helmand particularly vulnerable to high
intensity political violence, a number of contextual factors are contributing to the
escalation of the security situation into a fully fledged war. The extreme poverty and illegal
economy have allowed anti state actors to penetrate Helmand’s social fabric whilst
eradication policies, through their destruction of people’s livelihoods, have alienated rural
communities and strengthened the legitimacy claims of the insurgents. Alongside
eradication the government has exacerbated local dissatisfaction and disillusionment by
failing to deliver security and enforce law and order in the province.
The insurgents are taking advantage of this weak control system. They are also intensifying
the attacks on government and international forces by employing more sophisticated, low
cost, high intensity tactics, such as remotely activated IEDs, suicide bombings and rocket
attacks. Insurgents are also increasingly willing to engage in open clashes with ANP and
ANA troops, turning Helmand in a out-and-out battle ground.
As insurgency tactics change, government control over the province dwindles; entire
villages and towns fall under insurgent control. As the insurgents’ hold grows in size and
duration the local population’s perception of who are the real power holders shifts.
|