1.1 LACK OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
Helmand has long held a dominant position in opium production in Afghanistan, accounting for around 25% of total opium production in recent years. Opium production has proven a resilient economic activity, providing the major source of livelihood as it generates around 50% of total income in the province. Dramatic increases in opium production in the range of 30% to 80% have been indicated by all major actors in Helmand who were interviewed in spring 2006, including farmers, religious leaders and law enforcement officials.
Moreover, Helmand is in a position of comparative advantage with respect to trade in illegal commodities given its proximity to the border and the fact that the borderlands on both sides have limited state presence. Reportedly, the profit gained by drug dealers and traffickers as it reaches its consumers across the world exceeds US$1 billion.
In the fragile political and security situation in Helmand, there are distinct advantages for the rural population to engage in opium cultivation. Opium poppy is well-suited to the climatic conditions, producing exceptionally high yields and maximising returns on less secure irrigation systems and limited land areas. Compared to all other crops, opium remains a low-risk crop within a high-risk environment and is a high-value, low-weight commodity for which there is vast demand. Moreover, notwithstanding the minimal economic infrastructure, there appears to be a well-organized market in terms of credit, purchase, transport and processing of opium. In particular, the traditional credit system –namely, the provision of an advance payment on a future crop– is considered a strong incentive to cultivate opium poppy over other crops.
Opium poppy cultivation in Helmand is so entrenched that the willingness and possession of appropriate skills by farmers to cultivate poppy determines their access to credit and land on a sharecropping or tenancy basis. In fact, the rental value of land is decided on the basis of potential opium yield rather than the productivity of wheat.
This is the fourth year that we cultivate opium. There is no water, no roads. Opium is easy to cultivate and it is the only means to survive.
Farmer in Helmand Province
15 May 2006
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Importantly, opium poppy in Helmand provides farmers with a vital source of livelihood. As the price of wheat in the province is estimated at only US$0.20 per kg compared to the price of opium at US$141 per kg, farmers’ access to agricultural inputs and basic food is determined by their decision to engage in opium poppy cultivation.
In light of the complexity of reasons and distinct benefits for opium cultivation in Helmand, efforts to reduce opium poppy cultivation on a sustainable basis need to address all the socioeconomic and agro-ecological drivers, as well as the factors related to risk and uncertainty, which influence farmers in engaging in this activity. Efforts to replace only one of the benefits generated by opium poppy cultivation with a legal alternative are bound to fail – a broader, longer term development and multi-sectoral effort is, instead, required.
In response to the opium crisis in Helmand Province, both the Government of Afghanistan and the international community have strongly advocated for the development of alternative livelihoods programmes. In effect, Helmand ranks amongst the biggest recipients of alternative livelihoods in Afghanistan for the year 2005/06, representing 11% of total aid. However, in relation to the size and scope of poppy cultivation per province, Helmand Province remains one of the lowest recipients receiving only US$1,895 per ha for poppy cultivation.
USAID has earmarked substantial funds for alternative livelihoods in Helmand Province – around US$84 million have been invested in 2005/06– focusing on building infrastructure and promoting business services. The donor organisation has funded the River and Irrigation Systems in the Helmand Valley, which includes rehabilitation of work on the rivers, canals, water gates, structures and banks that have deteriorated in the province. In particular, USAID finances the Kajakai hydro electric power plant, providing electrical power to the wider Lashkar Gah area and is planning to build a new industrial park focusing on alternative livelihoods. Nevertheless, only 10% of the funds are attributed to strengthening governance.
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is also a main contributor of alternative livelihoods in the province through its planned rural development programme. The Department is working with a number of organisations that specialise in community outreach and livelihood development such as The Tribal Liaison Office, Islamic Relief-UK, Afghanistan Reconstruction and Planning Department, Afghanistan National Construction Co-ordination and the Southern Afghanistan Development Association. Importantly, DFID is committing to give the Afghan Government aid figures on a three-years rolling basis in future years to increase funding predictability, and to channel at least 50% of its funding through the Government’s budget in order to strengthen state capacity and institutions.
The European Commission is investing more than US$156,000 in Helmand (and Uruzgan) to improve food security and another US$640,000 in animal health support in Helmand (Kandahar and Uruzgan). UN Agencies, including UNAMA, have also played a lead role in reconstruction projects in Helmand Province.
In view of the deteriorating security situation, there are only a limited number of national and international NGOs in the province. Indeed, some NGOs have abandoned or reduced their reconstruction efforts as a result of the escalating violence in the region. International private actors currently present in Helmand include RAMP and the Central Asian Development Group, which implement alternative livelihoods projects for USAID, Chemonics, Louis Berger Group focusing on building the ring road, and Mercy Corps. The latter began the "Women's Vocational Agriculture Education and Civil Society Building Project" in January 2004 with funding from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives through the International Organization for Migration. It works alongside the Ministry of Women's Affairs through its provincial office, the Helmand Women's Association (HWA), to improve women's agricultural skills and increase public awareness about the benefits of women's economic and social participation in civil society. Mercy Corps has also established the Bolan Farming Association in Helmand, with the aim of building cooperation between community groups and businesses. Currently, Mercy Corps together with the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAG) are planning to start work under the Microfinance Investment Services Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA). Recent rumours, however, suggest that some of these international NGOs are planning to leave Helmand due to security.
Alternative Income Project (AIP) – Cash for Work
In December 2004, USAID Alternative Livelihoods Programme launched a cash-for-work programme in Helmand Province aiming at providing immediate cash infusions to local communities through labour intensive work programmes, and encouraging farmers to abstain from opium poppy cultivation
One major project was the Marja irrigation drain cleaning in central Helmand, which aimed at improving agricultural productivity. USAID reports that this particular drain cleaning project has resulted in 47,000 hectares of farmland receiving increased access to water.
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In reality, alternative livelihoods programmes in Helmand have to date been substantially ineffective. The cash-for-work project represents a short-term single-sector intervention which, combined with limited funds, fails to achieve a shift towards the legal economy. Failing to address the root causes of opium poppy cultivation only leads to the relocation of the illegal production to neighbouring areas. Thus far, alternative livelihoods programmes have given little consideration to the varying levels of dependency on opium poppy cultivation amongst the different socioeconomic groups. Instead of focusing on the land poor and the areas where dependency is greatest, priority has been given to the relatively wealthy in assets and households. Hence, as the needy are deprived of access to the benefits of project assistance, opium poppy remains an integral part of rural livelihoods.
Successful interventions require not only the necessary economic infrastructure but, more importantly, institutions of formal governance and mechanisms of social protection. However, as illustrated, the central government currently has very little control over the province and its authority appears to be shrinking visibly in favour of the Taliban, narco-traffickers and Pakistani elements.
In the absence of economic infrastructure and legal income opportunities particularly for the land poor, as well as lack of formal institutions and sustainable development strategies across the province, the economic and security situation in Helmand will continue to deteriorate and farmers will have no other option but to continue engaging in the illegal opium poppy cultivation.
1.2 ACCESS TO QUALITY EDUCATION
Access to education and the quality of education facilities are indicative of the overall poor infrastructure and lack of resources for social development in Helmand Province.
There are 224 schools in the province, of which 26 are high schools, 52 middle schools and 137 primary schools. In addition, there are only two vocational high schools across the province, three religious schools (Madrasas) and one Teacher-Training School (Dar-ul Moalemeen). The contribution of NGOs in building or re-opening schools in the province has been vital. In particular, the Provincial Reconstruction Team has contributed to the opening of five schools including two high schools for girls, with other NGOs such as NARE and OPS also supporting the creation of education facilities and facilitating widespread access to education. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the provision of schools and curriculum development are not considered as part of the alternative livelihoods programmes and, thus, receive nominal funding.
Education facilities remain at an extremely low level, with overcrowded classes and limited number of teachers. Currently, the literacy rate is estimated at merely 14%, with 61% of boys and 80% of girls having no access to primary education mainly due to poor education facilities and lack of economic means. Undoubtedly, systematic efforts and funding are required in order to improve access to quality education and, hence, maximise the human potential in the province.
Importantly, the number discrepancy between male and female students is immense -only 1,305 girls compared to 113,148 boys attend school. In consideration of the threats and attacks being carried out against Girls Schools, such as those in Lashkar Gah, this considerable gap indicates that structural and cultural norms constitute a systematic impediment to female education and social development.
It is noteworthy that 26 schools in the districts of Baghran, Dishu and Gamser were forced to close by the Taliban. In addition, schools across the province have received threats or have been attacked by various insurgent groups. This is evident of the deteriorating security situation in the province in which provincial institutions, the police and army forces, as well as international forces are incapable of providing secure access to school facilities.
1.3 HEALTHCARE FACILITIES - DRUG ADDICTION ON THE RISE
Healthcare services in Helmand Province are undoubtedly inadequate. Since the Afghan Ministry of Health conducted the National Hospitals Assessment in April 2004, in which only two hospitals and clinics were identified in the province, no significant improvement has been reported.
With a limited capacity both in number of beds –population per hospital bed is estimated at 4,332– and in medical staff, healthcare services in Helmand Province are severely scarce. Even the Emergency Hospital in Lashkar Gah, which is funded by the Italian Government, remains incapable of addressing the increasing healthcare needs of the province as its mandate is limited. Additionally, hospitals in the province are malfunctioning as they have inadequate access to electricity and water, and limited access to communication (functional phone or radio).
In addition to the fragile security and political situation in Helmand Province, there is considerable lack of financial resources and management capacity for healthcare services. The vast majority of districts have no access to a facility able to provide medicine, surgery and maternity services, and the poor infrastructure severely impedes transportation. Accordingly, the local population in Helmand is deprived of the basic healthcare services as widely accepted.
In recent years, demand for drugs has increased significantly in Helmand Province. It is estimated that 8 per cent of the population in Helmand are drug addicts with the majority addicted to hashish, opium, heroin and glass crystal.
The factors commonly cited as causes for illegal drug consumption relate to the economic and political situation in the province - insecurity, poor governance, poverty and absence of legal economic opportunities, lack of education and inadequate resources and health services to deal with or provide treatment. Helmand Province is also experiencing an increasing influx of Afghan heroin addicts repatriated from Pakistan and Iran, where they were first introduced to the drug and to new forms of consumption. During the field research, syringes have been found in public places, testimony of the growing trend of injection drug use in Afghanistan.
In light of the deteriorating security and economic situation in the province, it is predicted that drug addiction will exacerbate, as in neighbouring Iran. Helmand Province is in no position to cope with such an eventuality: not only are overall healthcare facilities inadequate but, crucially, there are no addiction treatment capabilities.
1.4 COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE POLICIES AND PUBLIC DISILLUSIONMENT
With opium poppy cultivation in Helmand Province reaching unprecedented levels and the failure of alternative livelihoods programmes to address the opium crisis in its entirety, resources are poured into aggressive strategies such as crop eradication. The Central Eradication Planning Cell of the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics coordinates the eradication efforts throughout Afghanistan.
Afghan authorities, with the strong support of the US and the UK, launched an aggressive eradication programme in spring 2006 in Helmand Province, involving around 1,000 police officers, soldiers and other security forces. The Afghanistan Eradication Force commenced its eradication activities in the district of Dishu, planning to move from the south to the north of the province and concentrating on the areas surrounding the Helmand River. Faced with strong resistance by the rural population in Dishu, eradication forces moved to the districts of Naw Zad and Gamser.
US and UK-funded Poppy Elimination Program teams, composed of eight to ten Afghan and international experts and advisors, are currently being deployed to Helmand throughout 2006 in order to facilitate the eradication activities of provincial authorities. ISAF forces are not permitted to take direct, pre-planned action against opium trade, including eradication of opium poppy. Currently, ISAF and in particular British forces provide significant support to Afghan forces engaged in eradication, including training of police officers and resources, such as vehicles, necessary for the implementation of eradication activities. Furthermore, in light of the Afghan Government’s weak capacity in implementing its counter-narcotics activities –only thirty Afghan police officers are reported to have been trained in Helmand Province– British forces could, on the ground, shift towards direct engagement in eradication activities.
Following recent eradication activities in Helmand Province, Governor Mohammad Daoud claimed that Helmand authorities eradicated 7,000 hectares as opposed to western sources suggesting that only 1000 hectares were eradicated.
Eradication as a forceful counter-narcotics intervention primarily affects the most vulnerable actors of the opium economy, reinforcing farmers’ economic vulnerability. During the two-day independent Nationwide Farmers Jirga in May 2006, farmers spoke of the grave economic situation and the need to cultivate opium as a means to survive, reiterating their strong opposition to eradication. In the absence of alternative economic opportunities and mechanisms of social protection, farmers’ livelihoods are being destroyed. This leaves room for anti-state actors such as the Taliban to offer protection for opium cultivation and, thus, gain the confidence and support of rural communities.
Eradication without providing for meaningful alternative livelihoods is not sustainable. Eradication does not hold promise as a near-term solution, and forcible eradication can be counter-productive. Given the multi-dimensional nature of opium production in Afghanistan, counter-narcotics efforts should be mainstreamed into all aspects of development: security, economic growth and governance. There are no quick and simple solutions.
Ali Jalali
Former Afghan Interior Minister
May 2006
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In turn, this spurs discontent with the Government and fuels volatility, whilst compromising the conditions necessary for the establishment and good operations of the PRTs. As security challenges facing Afghan and international forces in the province intensify, security and overall reconstruction efforts become irreconcilable.
There have been widespread allegations in the rural communities that the eradication process is corrupted at many levels and it is being used by provincial government representatives as an instrument of exerting power over the rural population. It is considered that eradication typically targets the poor and those in more visible locations. Instead, the rich and those who know people in positions of influence are considered as the least likely to be affected by eradication.
22 March 2006. This field was not eradicated as Commander Daoud accepted a bribe of 300,000 Rupees by the owner of the poppy field. The eradication team also played a wait and see game to see who will be offering bribes. Bribes range between 3,000-4,000 Rupees per jerib.
Eradication carried out in the district of Reg during the period 20-31 March 2006 is clear evidence of the corruption within the eradication process. The eradication team, which was led and commanded by the district police chief, was comprised of ANA and ANP officers. American forces were also present. Reports indicate that the police chief accepted a number of bribes not to eradicate for the price of 3,000-4,000 Rupees per jerib. During eradication, disgruntled farmers jointly voiced their anger calling for retaliation against the international forces, the ANA and the ANP. Landmines, which were provided by the Taliban and deliberately placed in the fields by farmers, destroyed four vehicles used for eradication. A firefight later broke out between anti-government elements and coalition/local governance forces.
The inconsistent and unequal nature of eradication policies carried out by government and international forces throughout Helmand Province have led to increasing resentment among the local population. In particular, international troops are currently regarded as a purely military force, which jointly with the Afghan government, embark on targeted forceful action against farmers and their families. Local confidence in the Afghan government and international forces will be very difficult to restore.
Broken promises made by the British government to farmers in Helmand in 2002 regarding compensation for voluntary opium poppy eradication have recently re-emerged leading to further hostility towards the British forces. Farmers who participated in the programme claim that the promised payment of US$350 per Jerib voluntarily eradicated (one fifth of a hectare) was never received, despite the fact that official documents certify the eradication of 62,000 jeribs. This brings the total farmers claim is owing to them to US$21 million. With farmers feeling betrayed by the British government, this has led to the breakdown in their relations, casting doubts on the possibility of success of the British troops’ deployment in the province.
The deterioration of the security situation combined with the inability to provide adequate troops, the use of heavy-handed tactics to search for militants and high levels of corruption have led to further discontent with the government and the international community. Following announced reductions in American troops and their replacement by NATO forces, public speculation that the US is abandoning southern Afghanistan at a critical time has been expressed. Importantly, these developments have led to increasing sympathy for the Taliban who are steadily filling the growing security vacuum in the south.
The international community has promised to bring stability in Helmand Province but instead the security situation has deteriorated. It is very difficult to live under these circumstances.
Ali Jalali
Helmand resident
16 May 2006
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The lack of security is a major impediment to the development and reconstruction efforts in Helmand Province. In this fragile security environment, international development agencies and Afghan aid organizations are unable to provide sufficient aid and reconstruction. Additionally, the combination of ill-adapted alternative livelihoods policies and the failure by the international community to provide the funds necessary for the reconstruction and nation-building in the south have led to widespread public disillusionment. Infrastructure in Helmand Province, including transport, education and healthcare facilities, remains poor and funds for rebuilding the vital agricultural sector are constrained. Consequently, the majority of the rural population continues to engage in opium cultivation as a source of livelihood. In the absence of real economic alternatives and mechanisms of social protection, farmers whose crop had been eradicated in the past have reverted to cultivating opium as a means to survive.
Unfulfilled promises of security and reconstruction in Helmand Province have led to increasing distrust of the international community and the Afghan government. Widespread public disillusionment over the failure by the major players in Afghanistan to rebuild Helmand Province is, crucially, reflected in the current Taliban resurgence.
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