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Chapter III : Failed Counter-Narcotics Policies Central to Failure of Afghanistan’s Reconstruction
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From 2001, failed counter-narcotics policy
Conclusions and Recommandations
Field Report: Failed counter-narcotics policy fuelling poverty and insecurity
Failed Counter-Narcotics Policy Central to Failure of Afghanistan’s Reconstruction
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A. Failed counter-narcotics policies
B. Failure of eradication as a policy
C. Poppy at the centre of Afghanistan’s security and development crises
D. Learning from global lessons on eradication and poppy control
E. Poppy as a potential economic resource for Afghanistan
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Summary: From 2001, failed counter-narcotics policies
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Misguided and badly formulated drug policy has accelerated and compounded all of Afghanistan’s problems, and has effectively hijacked the international community’s nation-building efforts in the country. Five years ago, the international community prioritised counter-narcotics as one of their top objectives for Afghanistan, yet this priority, almost more than anything else, ignored the realities of the country. Afghanistan is severely debilitated by poverty, and poppy cultivation represents a survival strategy for millions of Afghans. Most of Afghanistan is so mired in poverty that without poppy, families cannot feed their children. This misplaced prioritisation of counter-narcotics focused substantial amounts of aid funds away from development and poverty relief; prompted the formulation of bad drug policies for Afghanistan and misinformed the implementation strategies for these eradication and alternative development policies.
Yet despite all counter-narcotics and alternative development funds, the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever, and entrenched in almost all facets of Afghan society. Five years of flawed counter-narcotics priorities have brought no positive change in Afghanistan. They have only served to undermine government legitimacy, stability, security and development, whilst farmers have lost confidence in the current Karzai administration. Ultimately, this loss of confidence has ultimately aided insurgents. Five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total.
Many families in Afghanistan cultivate poppy simply to survive
Poppy eradication alone does not work and is counter-productive, displacing poppy cultivation to more remote areas and fuelling violence and insecurity, as has been shown recently in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. Opium production in Afghanistan can only be reduced in the long-term by finding a permanent solution to poverty relief, which must be the ultimate priority for the international community forces before the eradication of a crop that serves as the main income to millions of Afghans.
Both the perceived and actual involvement of the international military coalitions in the formulation and implementation of Afghan counter-narcotics policies is undermining Afghanistan’s democratically elected government. The prioritisation of counter-narcotics efforts has contributed to a growing perception in Afghanistan that the international community is not working to help the Afghan people. There is widespread disillusionment with reconstruction and development efforts. Many Afghans are increasingly asking why, if the international community insists it is helping Afghanistan, they are so intent on destroying the one means many Afghans have of providing for their families?
Eradication strategies have had direct and extremely negative effects on security and stabilisation efforts in the country. The implementation of eradication programmes in southern Afghanistan marked the tipping point in the country’s insurgency, by fostering widespread support for those groups willing and able to challenge ‘government’ policies and thereby protect poppy farmers’ livelihoods.
Conclusions
The opium crisis lies at the heart of the Afghanistan’s security and development crises
The failing drugs policies currently being applied in Afghanistan must be urgently refocused to prevent the imminent collapse of the country. New responses to the opium crisis are urgently needed to unlock the country’s development and make a success of international aid and military commitments to Afghanistan.
Eradication dramatically exacerbates poverty and has caused a wave of starvation across southern Afghanistan
Eradication is an ineffective and discredited counter-narcotics strategy which attacks those who are profiting least in the opium trade – Afghanistan’s rural farming communities. Eradication fuels violence and insecurity, and is paving the way for the Taliban’s return to power.
War on drugs is perceived as war on Afghans
Afghans experience the international community’s ‘war on drugs’ as a war on Afghans, with their livelihoods being destroyed by militaristic, counter narcotics policies that act against the poor of the country. For Afghans, aggressive counter-narcotics programmes exemplify the international community’s disregard for the realities of the day-to-day existence of Afghans.
Recommendations
Recommendation I: Eliminating poverty must be top priority
Emergency poverty measures must be urgently implemented, and all counter-narcotics policies must be re-sequenced. For many rural Afghan communities, poppy cultivation is their only survival strategy: failed counter-narcotics policies attack Afghanistan’s most impoverished farmers. Viable and sustainable economic alternatives to poppy cultivation must be implemented before tackling the opium crisis.
Recommendation II: Stop all poppy eradication operations and grant poppy farmers a period of grace
The international community must stop attacks on the livelihoods of poor rural communities: all poppy eradication operations must stop. Aggressive crop eradication operations accelerate the deterioration of security. Afghanistan should learn from Turkey’s past opium crisis, with targeted development aid, support and the implementation of a system of licensed poppy cultivation in rural areas. This will impact positively on the establishment of stability, the rule of law and economic growth in the country, whilst helping to change Afghans’ perceptions of the West for the better.
Recommendation III: The licensing of poppy cultivation for the production of essential medicines should be implemented
Licensing poppy cultivation for the production of essential medicines should be employed to combat the poverty of farmers and illegal opium trafficking. Licensing can provide the Afghan central government with the opportunity to integrate the strong, local and informal governance structures in poppy licensing control system which meets the needs of Afghans. This program can meet the worldwide shortage of essential opium-based medicines, thereby benefiting Afghan farmers and providing much-needed pain relief around the world.
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Field report: Counter-narcotics policies fuelling poverty and insecurity
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Five years of flawed priorities have brought no positive change in Afghanistan. Instead, it is shown that misguided policies have only served in undermining government legitimacy, stability, security and development, whilst farmers have lost confidence in the current Karzai administration, which has ultimately aided insurgents. Five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total, despite billions of dollars worth of counter-narcotics and alternative development.
The current policy of poppy eradication alone does not work and is counter-productive, displacing poppy cultivation to more remote areas and fuelling violence and insecurity, as has been shown recently in the southern provinces of Afghanistan.
The majority of Afghans believe that the current war in their country is due to the issues of counter-narcotics, particularly in the south . As shown in the Bonn Agreement in 2001, the issue of counter-narcotics was an international community priority from the offset, led by the United States and the United Kingdom. However, this priority failed to address the reality of Afghanistan: acutely severe poverty.
As such, this misplaced priority meant huge amounts of aid funds were being, and continue to be, poured into military missions instead of development and poverty relief. In turn, this forced the premature formulation of bad drug policies in Afghanistan – immediate elimination of all crops. It also led to misguided implementation strategies, such as bungled compensation schemes, eradication, uncoordinated alternative development, aerial spraying and fighting farmers.
Despite attempts at counter-narcotics and alternative development funding, the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever, entrenched in almost all facets of Afghan society. It is revealed that crop eradication has led to widespread poverty amongst already impoverished farmers, many of whom are turning to the Taliban for protection against the destruction of their livelihoods. Rumours of bribes and illegal smuggling amongst the international community are rife, and the deterioration of the economy has led many Afghans to leave their country in search of a better life .
For many of those who suffered from crop eradication, all “foreigners” are considered untrustworthy. Promised money for co-operation in crop eradication has not been paid to many Afghans, whose families are starving because their livelihoods have been destroyed. These damaging perceptions of international military forces have helped boost the insurgency and undermine the Afghan government.
In short, the flawed drug policy in Afghanistan has accelerated and compounded all of the country’s problems. Opium production in Afghanistan can only be reduced in the long-term by finding a permanent solution to poverty relief, which must be the ultimate priority before the international community forces the eradication of a crop that serves as the main income to millions of Afghans.
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