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Presented by Prof Francisco E Thoumi,
Founder, Drug Policy Institute, Colombia
1.Alternative Development and eradication programs have been implemented in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru during the last 20 years. Bolivia has had the greatest experience followed by Peru and Colombia.
2. Chapare, the main illicit coca-growing region in Bolivia has received a large amount of investment in infrastructure and promotion of legal activities. For over a decade it has had the best infrastructure (highways, health, education, electricity, water facilities) than any other rural region in Bolivia. In Peru there has also been significant investment in the Upper Huallaga valley. Alternative Development in Colombia has been a less important aspect of anti drug policies than in the other two countries.
3. Eradication in Colombia has been done mostly through aerial spraying. The state does not control large parts of the country and guerrilla and paramilitary groups involved in drug trafficking prevent the state from undertaking large manual eradication programs. In Bolivia and Peru aerial spraying is illegal. Manual eradication has been performed following various arrangements. Voluntary eradication has been done either under threat or under a system of financial compensation. After voluntary eradication was tried without great success, forced manual eradication programs were implemented.
4. Bolivia applied one such program from 1998 on with remarkable success. UNODC estimates that in 1997 Bolivia had 33,800 hectares of illegal coca plantings. These fell to 2,600 in 2000. By 2004, however, there were 15,700 a figure that is likely to rise again this year.
5. In 1995 Peru had 107,300 illicit coca hectares. A forced manual eradication program was implemented. Illicit coca acreage fell to 26,700 hectares in 1999 but it also bounced back to 38,300 in 2004 and it is also expected to increase in 2005.
6. Colombia has had a very strong aerial spraying program, particularly during the last few years. UNODC figures show 163,300 coca hectares in 2000. After fumigation of over 400,000 hectares, coca plantings fell to 80,000 in 2004. In 2004 over 130,000 hectares were sprayed and coca plantings fell by 6,000 hectares. US State Department figures are significantly different. They show about 130,000 hectares in 2000 and 114,000 in 2004.
7. UNODC figures show 188,000 illicit coca hectares in the three countries in 1990. This figure remained relatively stable until 1996. Since then, total plantings have fell reaching 134,000 in 2004. Productivity has increased substantially during this period and potential cocaine output that was at 774 tons in 1990 declined only to 674 tons in 2004.
8. In Colombia there has been a substantial debate about aerial spraying focused mainly on its negative health effects. The official U.S. and Colombian governments position is that aerial spraying with glyphosate is harmless. There have been many complaints from peasants but almost all cannot be supported. Most complaints refer to infections caused by the spraying. Glyphosate can intoxicate but it cannot infect anybody. There is a possible indirect infection effect because the population sprayed may have very low defenses due to malnutrition and other tropical illnesses but this link is difficult to prove because peasants use many other chemicals that are a lot stronger than glyphosate. Yet, it is believed by many peasants and their supporters that glyphosate is deadly.
9. Glyphosate can harm fish and other water animals and there have been a few occasions in which the U.S. and Colombian governments have compensated peasants for loss of property caused by spraying mistakes. In a few cases these have also included fumigation of Alternative Development crops.
10. Alternative Development has been difficult to implement. Markets for AD products are highly competitive and very unstable. Also, cultural differences between peasants, government officials and international donors result in significant misunderstandings and failed expectations. The forced eradication program in Bolivia was implemented at a time when AD product markets in Argentina and Brazil collapsed. Eradication compounded an already bad economic situation and led to a strong politization of the peasant movement to the point that current polls show cocalero leader Evo Morales as the leading presidential candidate in the forthcoming election. Cocalero expectations have been frequently frustrated because they government has not had the resources to fund promises made under the pressure to respond to cocalero marches and highway blockades and because words have different meanings to different people in a multi-cultural country.
11. In Peru the peasant movement is not as strong as in Bolivia, but the president is very unpopular and weak and has not been able to respond to peasant pressures. Here again, AD has not been sustainable.
12. In Colombia guerrillas, paramilitary and illicit drugs are intertwined. The government has implemented a hard hand policy that considers coca and poppy growing peasants part of the illicit trafficking organizations. The country has the second largest number of displaced people in the world. The lowest estimate is about 1.5 million and the number may be as high as 2.5 million. The government has programs to support and help displaced peoples but peasants whose crops have been sprayed are excluded from the benefits of those programs.
13. Aerial spraying in Colombia is having very important negative effects unrelated to peasant health. First, it increases the supply of people willing to join guerrilla and paramilitary groups. Second, it displaces people and third, it displaces illicit crops. These effects are difficult to quantify but they are important.
14. Colombia is currently confronting alternative livelihood problems not just with coca and poppy growing peasants. During this year about 20,000 paramilitary fighters have participated in a demobilization program. Most of them do not have the skills and discipline to join the regular labor force. Some are already doing what they do best: extort, rob and commit other crimes. The President has promoted a forest guards program to employ former coca growing peasants. These guards are supposed to oversee the tropical forest and prevent its destruction. Unfortunately, the state does not have significant presence in these regions and there is no way to supervise most of those guards. Indeed, a significant area under this program is controlled by guerrillas and paramilitary groups who in turn get a cut of what the government pays the guards. Furthermore, this program is not very labor intensive and cannot employ a large number of peasants.
15. Despite the apparent success shown by official crop figures, illicit plantings have spread across the three countries involved. Five years ago illicit crops were present in 13 of the 32 Colombian departments. Today they are in 23 of them. The intensive spraying means that last year’s figures include a high proportion of new coca hectares that have not reached production peaks. It is expected then that the real crop may be larger this year.
16. Official figures however, are contradictory. UNODC shows 2004 potential cocaine output of 674 tons and worldwide cocaine seizures of 340 tons. This leaves 334 tons to satisfy demand and production and trafficking losses. U.S. demand is estimated at about 300 to 320 tons a year leaving nothing for the rest of the world. At the same time, there is no evidence of a cocaine shortage and retail price increases. This puzzling situation is officially explained by various sources that claim that the FARC guerrilla group is selling stocks because the government’s “Plan Patriota” is succeeding in putting the guerrillas on the defensive. Other official claim is that the current negotiations with paramilitary groups have induced them to sell stocks before they turn on their weapons so that they can launder their assets through their peace negotiations. Another explanation is that the large Mexican cartels are selling their stocks. While nobody explains why these groups saved stocks in the first place, it is important to mote that UNODC figures also show that world potential cocaine output peaked at 950 tons in 1997 and declined slowly since then to 800 in 2002. This decline accelerated in 2003 and 2004. During this period new markets have grown. I am at a loss to understand what is then the current situation.
17. There have been some Alternative Development successes in the Andes even though they might not have contributes significantly to a cocaine supply reduction. These programs have been in regions where community organizations are strong and the governments have negotiated successfully with them. To get these achievements it has been necessary for all parties to act in good faith and for the government to have the capacity to deliver on its promises. The importance of community structure cannot be minimized. Indian tribes have been very important in Colombia in these cases. Illicit drugs have threatened their social structures and tribal elders have been willing and eager to negotiate AD programs. The private sector involvement in these programs has also been very important as it can provide guarantees that the AD products have markets and stable prices. A few large supermarket chains have collaborated successfully in these endeavors.
18. While these successes are encouraging, the problem of developing sustainable alternative livelihoods for the peasants remains a big obstacle for illegal crop eradication. Several options must be explored. Many illicit crops in the Andes are located in areas settled relatively recently. In most of these areas the best use of the land is to leave it as natural forest. Employment for the peasantry must be found in other places and economic activities. AD should consider possible land reform programs in other locations (a point of particular importance in Colombia): to develop new working skills to improve peasants ability to compete in a globalized economy; rural industrialization programs to provide non-agricultural rural income; to invest in programs to prevent migrations to unsettled jungle regions; and other similar programs. As I have argued extensively in the past, the profitability of illegal drugs is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for illicit drug production to take place. Countries produce drugs, and Colombia and Afghanistan concentrate the production of cocaine and heroin as the result of processes that involve the countries’ structure, their institutions and their culture (values, attitudes and beliefs). Successful anti-drug polices require understanding those processes and implementing significant social, political and economic reforms, not just traditional anti-drug policies.
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